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1 
IP Things as Boundary Objects:  The Case of the 
Copyright Work 
 
Michael J. MadisonF* 
 
An ethic to supplement and guide the economic relation to land presupposes 
the existence of some mental image of land as a biotic mechanism.  We can 
be ethical only in relation to something we can see, feel, understand, love, or 
otherwise have faith in. 
--Aldo LeopoldF1 
 
I.  Introduction 
Why does intellectual property law concern itself with intangible things – 
inventions in patent law, works in copyright law, marks or signs in trademark 
law, and so on?  The question points to something that seems overly technical, or 
formalist, in a way that distracts lawyers, courts, legislators, and policymakers 
from more important matters:  the hard work of balancing the interests of first-
generation innovators, creators, and authors; second-generation practitioners, 
consumers, and readers; and intermediaries of all kinds in the flow of knowledge 
and innovation through society.  Responding formalistically, the answer is partly 
historical, to be sure.  But the answer is also both conceptual and pragmatic.  
These “intellectual property [IP] things” are critical to the social and cultural 
function of IP law just as things more broadly are critical to the law in general.  
“What is an invention?” or “what is a work?” – the latter question being the 
subject of this chapter – turn out to be far from technical or formal or 
metaphysical.  They are, instead, questions that go to the heart of the several 
roles that IP things play in both law and culture generally.  Even though the flow 
of knowledge and innovation are critical to the effective functioning of IP law, the 
forms of knowledge and innovation matter mightily, too. 
                                                                                                                                     
* Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law.  Email: 
michael.j.madison@gmail.com.  Earlier versions of this chapter were presented at the 
Fourth Annual Workshop of the International Society for the History and Theory of 
Intellectual Property, at the London School of Economics; at the McGill University 
Faculty of Law; and at the Conference on Searching for the Boundaries of Intellectual 
Property Law at the University of Hong Kong. 
1
 Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac, and Sketches Here and There 214 (1968) 
(1949). 
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2 
This chapter builds on my earlier writing on “things” in law and practice, F2F in 
which I made two points.  First, I suggested that lawyers, scholars, judges, and 
policymakers are insufficiently attentive to the important roles that material and 
virtual objects play in our legal system, notwithstanding decades of attention to 
relational models of legal analysis encouraged by American Legal Realists and 
their successors.  Second, I suggested that the law itself makes its objects, 
sometimes building them and sometimes finding them, and in that sense the law 
itself makes culture.  I suggested a range of techniques and tools that legal actors 
use to make and find legal things.   The heterogeneity of law’s methods holds 
important lessons for law and policy. Things, objects, and concepts are 
unavoidable yet often not perfectly definable.   
In this chapter I pursue a related question:  Is there a broader framework 
within which these methods operate, and a broader purpose to which they are 
put?  What do things do, and what does law do with things?  One might assume 
that the sole or primary next step with respect to IP things, for example, such as 
inventions and works, is that they become assets, exchanged in markets.  
Individuals and firms sell and buy copies.   My claim in this chapter, however, is 
that copyright works (to take the case that interests me at present) are dynamic.  
Over their lives, as it were, and over the lives of authors, heirs, readers, and 
consumers, works take several forms and meanings and, as the law creates and 
interprets them, perform a number of functions.  That different perspective on 
what things do and what law does with things brings several implications for the 
law.   
The first of these, and the focus of this chapter, is that IP law in general and 
copyright law in particular should give up its demand that IP rights in works and 
in inventions be identified with specificity and certainty, so that the “metes and 
bounds” of a copyright or patent claim might be specified by analogy to the 
“metes and bounds” of a claim to real property.  Instead, and because of the 
multiple dynamic functions of IP things, IP law does seek out, and should seek 
out, the fluidity of what appear to be the fixed boundaries of the work.  That 
fluidity allows IP law to address two kinds of value pluralism with respect to the 
domains with which it is concerned:  competing and therefore plural values with 
respect to any particular invention or work, and competing and therefore plural 
values with respect to the existence, definition, and scope of the things to which 
IP rights might apply.  Works are not only the sites of contests between individual 
claimants to the value associated with an author’s creative expression, that is, 
boundaries within the scope of copyright itself.  Works are also loci of contests 
                                                                                                                                     
2 Michael J. Madison, Law as Design: Objects, Concepts, and Digital Things, 56 
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 381 (2005).  For recent scholarship renewing interest in thing-
ness in property law, see Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1691 (2012); Lee Anne Fennell, Lumpy Property, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1655 (2012); 
Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, A Planet by Any Other Name, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 1011 (2010).  
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3 
and reconciliations among overlapping and sometimes competing social, cultural, 
and economic groups, institutions, and markets, that is, boundaries between 
copyright and culture, and between competing cultural interests. 
 To explore this topic, I focus on the idea of boundaries in a different sense.  I 
supplement my earlier account of things with literature that identifies and 
explores so-called boundary objects—physical and intangible things that bridge 
distinct but complementary communities in flexible ways. F3F  Examining the idea 
of the work, the canonical thing of copyright law, I argue that the law (here, 
copyright) adopts and uses things (here, the work) in several different but related 
ways that can be unified conceptually in the following sense:  The work operates 
as a boundary object across a number of different legal and cultural divides, 
clarifying the distinct status of relevant communities and practices but also 
bridging them, and ultimately if imperfectly and incompletely aligning them.  
Thing-ness is a recursive process in the law.  The law makes things and explicitly 
or implicitly seeks the boundaries of things. F4F  But things also create and manage 
boundaries, and the law uses things to do that.  The latter part of that dynamic is 
my focus here. 
The boundary object construct therefore pairs my interest in legal and 
phenomenal things with my interest in two other, related foci of analysis:  legal 
and phenomenal groups and communities, F5F and the uses of metaphor in law, 
particularly metaphors grounded in geography and the physical basis of human 
experience.F6F  The introductory quotation above is from the work of the American 
environmentalist Aldo Leopold.  For him, land was the necessary physical and 
metaphorical thing; the question he sought to answer – a cousin of my question 
here – was how to organize social life in relation to the natural resources that we 
rely on.  I borrow that insight metaphorically, replacing physical place as the 
metaphorical space and time relevant to law, with objects.  Having relied on law 
in large part to create the legally-recognized things (cultural resources) that we 
rely on, how do we organize social life in relation to those things?   
                                                                                                                                     
3 The concept of the boundary object was introduced in Susan Leigh Star & James R. 
Griesemer, Institutional Ecology, 'Translations' and Boundary Objects: Amateurs and 
Professionals in Berkeley's Museum of Vertebrate Zoology, 1907-1939, 19 Social Stud. 
Sci. 387 (1989).   
4 See Michael J. Madison, The Narratives of Cyberspace Law (or, Learning from 
Casablanca), 27 Colum. J. L. & Arts 249, 257-58 (2004) (commenting on the recursive, 
created character of boundaries in cyberspace). 
5 See Michael J. Madison, Social Software, Groups, and Governance, 2006 Mich. 
St. L. Rev. 153. 
6 See Michael J. Madison, Notes on a Geography of Knowledge, 77 Fordham L. 
Rev. 2038 (2009) (hereinafter, “Notes”); Michael J. Madison, Rights of Access and the 
Shape of the Internet, 44 B.C. L. Rev. 433 (2003). 
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4 
This is not primarily or exclusively a question concerning property law, 
either in the sense that things might be defined so that they might be possessed 
or so that trespassers might be excluded, or in the sense that property law is 
designed to allocate interests in things.7  Instead, the question concerns a higher 
order (as well as lower order) relationship between law and culture.  I build 
outward from IP law, as a particularly troublesome body of law that concerns 
certain types of cultural things:  intangible things that bear close relationships to 
the life of the mind.   IP law has an enormous amount to say about the shape of 
culture, and it is anchored in a handful of fundamental yet ill-defined conceptual 
things.  Those change over time, as virtually all concepts do, but worse, in some 
key cases they seem to have little to no meaning whatsoever.  IP things seem to be 
simultaneously central yet vacant.  Can the thing-ness of those concepts be 
rehabilitated, should they be rehabilitated, and if so, how? 
   The two central things in IP law are inventions, which are central to patent 
law, and works, which are central to copyright.  In both contexts, subsidiary 
concepts often get more attention.  In patent law, the ideas of “invention” and 
“the invention” (related but distinct concepts) are largely reducible to novelty, 
nonobviousness (in American law), an “inventive” step (in other patent systems), 
and utility.  “Invention” often has little independent meaning. In copyright law, 
the concept of the work builds principally on the idea of the author, to whom a 
work owes necessary originality or expression, and in the American system, on 
the concept of fixation or tangibility.  But just as the author is copyright’s person, 
the work is copyright’s thing.  And as patent law invokes the idea of the invention 
and seems to give that concept little independent significance, copyright law 
invokes the idea of the work, represented in American law as the “original work 
of authorship”8 and elsewhere as the “copyright work,”9 and rarely gives the work 
itself much weight.  The omission is noteworthy not only in copyright practice but 
also in copyright literature.  An enormous amount of scholars’ ink and lawyers’ 
and judges’ time have been spent decoding originality and expression; 
comparably little effort has been devoted to the work.  It is, therefore, my 
principal subject and case study with respect to the legal meaning and functions 
of things in general and IP things in particular.F10F   
                                                                                                                                     
7 The idea that property law and social life are mutually constitutive is well-
represented in the scholarship of Carol Rose, among others.  See Carol M. Rose, 
Property as Persuasion: Essays on the History, Theory and Rhetoric of 
Ownership (1994). 
8
 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). 
9
 See Brad Sherman, What is a Copyright Work?, 12 Theor. Inq. L. 99 (2011). 
10 My interest coincides with a modest amount of other recent scholarship on the 
same topic.  See Paul Goldstein, What is a Copyrighted Work? Why Does it Matter?, 58 
Michael J. Madison – IP Things as Boundary Objects –March 31, 2013 
 DRAFT:  Please do not cite or quote without the permission of the author.  
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
5 
Why now?  The idea of the work has been fundamental to most copyright law 
of the last century and a half, and during that time it has served both law and 
society tolerably well.  The emergence of digital technology both challenges the 
concept of the work and reveals its limitations.  In the analog era, fixation of 
copyright works in visible and possesssable forms (in economists’ terms, 
obviously rival copies) lent credence to the proposition that copyright works had 
tolerably well-defined limits.  But how does one define the limits of a digital 
thing, that is, of a form of expression that by definition is expressed in a string of 
1’s and 0’s?  Any edge or limit is arbitrary in a sense, because the work ends 
wherever one declares that the string stops, and the string can easily be modified.  
What is a digital work, or a digital thing?  Definitions based on outer boundaries 
or outer limits are apt to be illusory.  Yet a copyright work today is thought to be 
medium-independent.  If the boundaries of digital things are both technically and 
conceptually unclear, then comparable weaknesses lurk below the surface of the 
problem of identifying boundaries for works rendered in analog forms.  In other 
words, digital technology exposes an older problem that is not simply 
technological.  What I call the de-materialization of the work, along with the 
consequences of de-materialization for the law as well as for creative practices, 
have their roots in the emergence of modern copyright law more than a century 
ago.  What are the boundaries of a pure intangible? 
What began as a formal question and seemed to slip into conceptual mush —
what is the work, and how does the work interact with culture? — has significant 
practical implications.  The existence of a work determines the existence and 
scope of a copyright owner’s initial rights.F11F  In an infringement suit, identity 
between the plaintiff’s work and the work of the accused infringer is fundamental 
to determining liability,F12F and a contrast between the plaintiff’s work and the 
defendant’s work is fundamental to determining the scope of possible fair use or 
fair dealing defenses.F13F  Given an initial work, does that work comprise subsidiary 
works (as a book might comprise separate chapters, each of which might be a 
work, or a book, film, or play might comprise multiple characters, each of which 
might be a work)?  When does an initial work become a new, derivative work or 
copyrightable adaptation?  American copyright law awards statutory damages on 
the basis of the number of works infringed, F14F giving copyright owners a 
substantial incentive to multiply the number of works they identify in their 
                                                                                                                                     
UCLA L. Rev. 1175 (2011); Justin Hughes, Size Matters (or Should) in Copyright Law, 
74 Fordham L. Rev. 575 (2005); see also sources cited infra note 12. 
11 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (providing the categories of works of authorship). 
12 See id. § 106 (setting forth the exclusive rights of the copyright owner). 
13 See id. § 107 (describing the fair use doctrine). 
14 See id. § 504(c) (providing for remedies for infringement). 
Michael J. Madison – IP Things as Boundary Objects –March 31, 2013 
 DRAFT:  Please do not cite or quote without the permission of the author.  
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
6 
creations.   
Those doctrinal implications represent the nominal superstructure of my 
inquiry.  Exploring the foundational questions is the real aim of this chapter.   
What analytical roles has the concept of the work been performing in the law, 
why has it been performing those roles, what flaws in the work have been 
exposed, and what, if anything, should law reformers do about them?  One might 
frame the question less in the form, “what is the work?” and more in the form, 
“why is the work?”  I argue below that copyright scholars and lawyers have been 
insufficiently attentive to the several dimensions of the work—functional, 
expressive, and communicative—which, combined, should inform our 
understanding of what the work is, what it means, and what it does.  Because I 
am ultimately more concerned with these foundational issues, differences 
between common law and civil law copyright traditions have relatively little 
bearing on the discussion.  Common law copyright treats “the work” primarily as 
an instrument of society’s interest in producing and distributing creative things.  
Civil law copyright treats “the work” primarily as recognition of the rights 
inherent in acts of authorship.  In both contexts the idea of “the work” is 
subjected to extensive definitional analysis, much of which, I argue, is ineffective 
or incomplete.   
I organize the chapter as follows.  First, to illustrate the proposition that the 
concept of the work has no natural, fixed boundaries in the positive law of 
copyright, I summarize the text and structure of the American Copyright Act, in 
light of relevant international copyright history as well as American copyright 
history.  For reasons of space I focus on American copyright law, although, as I 
note below, the idea of the work as foundational concept in copyright emerged 
elsewhere before it took firm hold in the United States, and the conceptual 
fragmentation that bedevils the idea of the work is not limited to American law.15F  
My goal, in other words, is not primarily an exegesis of the American statute nor, 
in the end, an exploration of copyright alone as such.  My goal is to investigate the 
extent to which the idea of the work in copyright can and should be isolated from 
the closely-related ideas of authorship and of tangibility, or medium, and to 
suggest that the idea of the work has no formal limits in the law.  In this sense, 
law has no formal independence from culture.  Second, to illustrate the functions 
of the concept of the work in copyright, I review a series of relatively recent cases 
from the American experience that show how and why courts struggle with the 
                                                                                                                                     
15 Several scholars outside the U.S. have queried the work in recent years.  See 
Justine Pila, Copyright and its Categories of Original Works, 30 Oxford J. Legal 
Stud. 229 (2010) (England); Justine Pila, An Intentional View of the Copyright Work, 71 
Modern L. Rev. 535 (2008) (England); Brad Sherman, What is a Copyright Work?, 12 
Theor. Inq. L. 99 (2011) (Australia); Michal Shur-Ofry, Baby Shoes and the Copyright 
Work: A Comment on Brad Sherman’s What Is a Copyright Work?, 12 Theor. Inq. L. 1 
(2011) (Israel). 
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7 
idea of the work.  This is not a comprehensive review.  The illustrations point to a 
central organizing theme behind the idea of the work: The work in general and a 
work in a particular case both represent and are defined by boundaries and 
boundedness.  I argue that if the concept of the work has value both legally and 
culturally, this is where that value (and values) gain traction. 
Boundaries and boundedness have at least two meanings, and courts, 
scholars, and legislators have gone astray by sometimes overinvesting in efforts 
to define the boundaries of the work, as an abstract concept applicable generally 
to all forms of creation governed by copyright, without appreciating the role of 
the work in creating and governing boundaries between other concepts, groups, 
communities, and legal and extra-legal phenomena.F16F  Third, I conclude with 
some tentative and preliminary observations on what it might mean for copyright 
were this second idea of boundaries to be given greater emphasis, under the 
rubric of the boundary object construct, whether in the context of a more robust 
idea of the work or in the context of abandoning it.  Beyond copyright, I offer 
some tentative suggestions for further application and refinement of the 
boundary object concept in law generally. 
 
II.  The Emergence of the Work as Intangible Thing 
What is a work?  What I aim to show here is that this question lacks a good 
answer as a formal or doctrinal matter, at least initially. Michel Foucault wrote, 
“A theory of the work does not exist, and the empirical task of those who naively 
undertake the editing of works often suffers in the absence of such a theory,” F17F 
and I am mindful of his point that the identity of the author and the identity of 
the work are co-creations, each, in its own ways, defining the other.  My quarry is 
                                                                                                                                     
16   My claim here extends by implication to concerns regarding the boundaries of 
copyright law, as markers of the appropriate sphere of influence of copyright relative to 
patent, trademark, and the public domain.  See, e.g., Lionel Bently, Copyright and the 
Death of the Author in Literature and Law, 57 Mod. L. Rev. 973, 976 (critiquing the 
argument that “[t]he boundaries of copyright law, built on the concept of authorship, no 
longer correspond to our ideas of what should be protected ….) and 983 & n. 54 ("These 
[digital, Internet] technologies change the ‘form’ of works, so that the boundaries of the 
properties can no longer be defined by anachronistic ideas of print and texts. … [n. 54] 
“Such changes will require that the text be reconceived and that new ways of identifying 
the boundary between what is mine and what is yours be established. The reformulation 
of the ways in which works are identified, their boundaries ascertained and 
remunerations allocated are likely to rely increasingly on statistical approximations, while 
users are much more likely to be charged by reference to ‘time’ rather than numbers of 
pages.”) (1994). 
17 Michel Foucault, What is an Author?, in The Essential Foucault 377, 379 (Paul 
Rabinow & Mark Rose eds., 2003). 
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8 
related, but it is distinct. I am after the meaning(s) of “the work” in the law, not in 
art.  What I am referring to here is the “work” as a legal thing, which is related to 
but which is conceptually and practically distinct from, the “work” or “the work of 
art” as an artistic or authorial object.  Authors and audiences create artistic 
works; the legal system creates copyrightable (or copyright) works. F18F  I suggest 
that the lack of a good answer is attributable in large part of the de-
materialization of the work during the latter part of the nineteenth century and 
the first part of the twentieth century.  The phenomenon of de-materialization is 
often associated either with the rise of conceptual art during the twentieth 
centuryF19F or with the emergence of digitization of expressive content during the 
latter twentieth century.F20F  Digital technology compounds the problem but did 
not create it.  To explore the point, I start with a brief examination of the 
American copyright statute, then move backward, through copyright history.   
 
A. Current American Copyright Law 
The word “work,” used as a noun, appears in almost every section of the 
American Copyright Act.  It permeates Section 101, listing definitions. F21F  It 
defines copyrightable subject matter, identifies the subject of the copyright 
owner’s exclusive rights, limits the scope of fair use, and qualifies the entitlement 
of the successful infringement claimant to statutory damages.  It is not an 
overstatement to argue that if one pulls too hard on the thread of the copyrighted 
work, the fabric of copyright law as a whole might unravel.  As the law uses the 
term, what does it mean? 
Section 101, the definitional section, does not include a definition of the 
work.  Looking further, in the context of the statute as a whole, it quickly becomes 
clear that the Copyright Act has not accomplished and cannot accomplish the 
goal that it appears to set for itself: to identify and apply a consistent and 
straightforward meaning (if not definition) of the work. 
                                                                                                                                     
18 David Saunders, Authorship and Copyright (1992); Madison, supra note 2; 
Sherman, supra note 8. 
19 See Lucy Lippard, Six Years: The Dematerialization of the Art Object 
(1973) (documenting the emergence of conceptual art). 
20 See John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas: A Framework for Patents and 
Copyrights in the Digital Age, Wired, Mar. 1994, at 84–90, 126–29, available at 
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/2.03/economy.ideas.html (arguing that de-
materialization has made copyright, which was designed to protect the bottle and not the 
wine, irrelevant in the digital era).  
21 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“anonymous work,” “architectural work,” “audiovisual 
works,” “best edition” of a work, “copies” are material objects in which a work is fixed, 
and so on). 
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9 
The canonical statement of copyrightable subject matter in American law 
appears in Section 102(a).  Copyright “subsists,” according to the statute, in 
“original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”F22F 
Some quick parsing distinguishes the phrase “original work of authorship” from 
the phrase “fixed in a tangible medium of expression.”  The related ideas of 
“tangible media of expression” and “fixation” are easy enough to appreciate, if not 
always easy to apply in practice, but logic yields the inference that “original works 
of authorship” might exist that are not “fixed in a tangible medium of 
expression.”  The text of Section 301(b)(1), concerning preemption of 
inconsistent state law, confirms the existence of “works of authorship not fixed in 
any tangible medium of expression.” F23F  On a first read, the idea of the work does 
not have to do with an author’s choice of medium.  
 But this is too quick.  No American copyright plaintiff is entitled to proceed 
with a claim unless the work is fixed in some tangible medium. The successive 
references to “the work” that is subject to the author’s exclusive rights in Section 
106 must include, necessarily, the assumption that “the work” is embodied in 
some tangible object.  “The work” has, at times, something to do with materiality 
and media. 
Yet we know the phrase “original works of authorship” refers to the 
intangible object of the law.  That is, in some respect the phrase refers to the 
author’s intellectual creation or production.  Some works of authorship are not 
original, both according to the logic of the statute (one might have a “work of 
authorship” not prefaced by the word “original”) and according to the Supreme 
Court in Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service.F24F  The idea of the work 
does not have to do solely with originality or with the scope and extent of the 
author’s expression.   
 Yet if the concept of the work requires the application of thingness that is 
independent of the author’s originality and authorship, neither are originality 
and authorship irrelevant to the identity of the work.  Far from it.  A work often is 
defined as what an author creates,F25F or as what an author claims or alleges to be 
the author’s creation.  But an author-centered approach runs a number of 
                                                                                                                                     
22 Id. § 102(a). 
23 Id. § 301(b)(1). 
24 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (“To qualify for copyright protection, a work must be 
original to the author.”). 
25 See, e.g., Christopher M. Newman, Transformation in Property and Copyright, 
56 Vill. L. Rev. 251, 292 (2011) (“A work of authorship is a planned sensory experience, 
designed by its author to give rise to an expressive experience in the mind of one or more 
intended audiences.”).  The necessary inter-twining of the work and authorship is 
essential to the civil law copyright tradition. 
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10 
substantial and well-known risks.  One is unreliability: authors have little 
incentive not to claim more than they actually created, although secondary 
evidence (such as evidence that the work, or text, speaks for itself) sometimes 
would backstop the author’s position.  A second is that an author-centric 
approach fails to interrogate the identity of the author or the sources on which 
“the author” draws.  What of a person who contributes to a collective project that 
results in a single work?  Is each contribution a work, because the contributor 
could fairly be characterized as an author?  Or is the author the person (or entity) 
that is accountable for the end result?  What about the “author” of material on 
which the later author draws?  The premises underlying these and other 
“authorship” inquiries are well-known.  Authors are usually real people, but 
authorship is a social and legal construct, even in cases where we plausibly 
identify a single person with a single artistic creation.  The work creates the 
author, in other words, as much as the author creates the work. F26F  A third risk is 
that equating the work with authorship overlooks the possibility that the work is 
performing an analytical function (or doing something else) that is distinct from 
the work that authorship is doing.  A “work” might be something other than a 
“work of authorship.”  The statute refers frequently to “the work” without 
qualifying it as a “work of authorship,” and it is often fair to infer (despite 
statutory instruction) that Congress meant “work of authorship” each time that it 
used the term “work.” But not always. 
For example, the definition of “derivative work” suggests that a “work” is 
nothing more (or less) than a “work of authorship”: 
A “derivative work” is a work based upon one or more 
preexisting works, such as a translation, musical 
arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture 
version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, 
condensation, or any other form in which a work may be 
recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of 
editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other 
modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work 
of authorship, is a “derivative work.”F27 
A derivative work is copyrightable and therefore is an original work of 
authorship.  It is a work that is based on another work.  In this instance the 
statute seems specifically to equate a “work” with “an original work of 
authorship.”   
                                                                                                                                     
26 See generally Martha Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright: Economic 
and Legal Conditions of the Emergence of the “Author,” 17 Eighteenth-Century Stud. 
425 (1984) (discussing the evolution of society’s conception of the author and his relation 
to the work). 
27 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining “derivative work”). 
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11 
For a contrasting example, consider the statutory version of copyright’s 
venerable distinction between uncopyrightable ideas and copyrightable 
expression.  Section 102(b) states: “In no case does copyright protection for an 
original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, 
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in 
which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”F28 
The text here is subject to multiple readings.  One version holds that “an 
original work of authorship” might be uncopyrightable despite the presence of 
originality and authorship.F29F  An alternative holds that copyright is barred under 
Section 102(b), at least in many cases—ideas, notably—because the work lacks 
originality or authorship.  The logical inference is that it is a work, but only a 
work, or in some cases not even that.  An uncopyrightable fact falls into the same 
analytical space.  A fact cannot be copyrighted because it lacks originality and/or 
authorship.  Is it a work?  Are uncopyrightable ideas and facts to be extracted 
from works, or are they by definition not part of works in the first place?  Are 
works necessarily antecedent to authorship, or are they necessarily bound up 
with it?  Feist seemed to conclude that some works have authors, and some do 
not.  The Copyright Act seems to suggest both, at different times.  As I argue 
below, so do the cases. 
Finally, the statute sometimes suggests that an idea or a process might not be 
a work of authorship—or a work at all—for reasons having to do with its 
definiteness, or lack thereof, rather than its authorship.  The fixation requirement 
serves this definiteness function to a significant degree, but the statute also deals 
with it separately.  A work has an independent thing-ness that copyright law is 
bound to respect, a claim that is underscored by the one statutory definition that 
bears on the question of the work: 
A work is “created” when it is fixed in a copy or phonorecord 
for the first time; where a work is prepared over a period of 
time, the portion of it that has been fixed at any particular 
time constitutes the work as of that time, and where the 
work has been prepared in different versions, each version 
constitutes a separate work.F30 
That text speaks to fixation, but it speaks separately to versions and portions—to 
                                                                                                                                     
28 Id. § 102(b). 
29 In other words, policy reasons might lead courts to deny the presence of an 
enforceable copyright even if the work otherwise met the formal requirements of the 
statute.  See, e.g., Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 978 (2d Cir. 
1980) (“[W]here, as here, the idea at issue is an interpretation of an historical event, our 
cases hold that such interpretations are not copyrightable as a matter of law.”). 
30 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining “created”). 
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size, and to edges, or limits F31F—and it does not touch directly on authorship or on 
originality.   
At the end of the day, considered in formal terms, the fairest thing that may 
be said of the Copyright Act itself is that it points in multiple directions when 
asked “what is the work?”  At times the work is what the author says it is, or what 
we understand the author to have intended; at times the work is what is original, 
or what is fixed in some tangible object.32 At times the work is only the sum total 
of the separate subject matter requirements of the statute.  At times the work is 
the embodiment of a requisite thing-ness.  And at times the work simply “is,” as 
an intangible thing, antecedent to considerations of authorship, tangibility, or 
definiteness.  
Can the problem be cured, formally, by interposing some boundaries to what 
we call the work?  The work can be defined in terms of other abstractions, all of 
which are necessarily unhelpful.  If the goal were to identify the “metes and 
bounds” of the work, as a patent claim arguably defines the scope of a patented 
invention, then the answer is almost certainly that the goal is unrealizable. F33F  The 
work is simply not subject to an all-purpose formal definition.  “Size matters (or 
should),” as Justin Hughes argues in proposing that copyright courts be 
empowered to deny enforcement to copyright claims where the work is simply 
too small.F34F  Helpful though that approach might be, the term and concept of the 
work captures too many things in a single word for the approach to be effective.  
A single word is too inflexible to deal with all the purposes that we assign to the 
subjects and objects of copyright and to all of the things that have been covered 
by copyright and might be covered by it in the future.  Copyright interests and 
claimants assign a multiplicity of values to any particular work, but also to the 
very concept of the work. 
Before turning to some cases that illustrate my point, we might question the 
relevant history and legislative history.  Is formalism really unhelpful here, even 
if the formal terms of the statute are supplemented by legislative intent?  For the 
                                                                                                                                     
31 See Hughes, supra note 10, at 578 (discussing lack of a clear “minimum size” 
principle in copyright law). 
32 See Madison, supra note 2 (describing the several methods by which law 
constitutes its objects). 
33 I draw attention here to the continuing struggles within patent law to define both 
what is a patented invention (that is, an invention as defined by patent law) and what is a 
patentable invention (that is, what is an invention that is possibly patentable).  The two 
uses of the word “invention” in patent law do not always refer to the same “thing.”  The 
most recent opinion of the United States Supreme Court on the question of patentable 
subject matter is Mayo Collaborative Svcs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (U.S. 
Mar. 20, 2012). 
34 Id. 
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reasons summarized next, I believe that the answer is yes: there is no formal 
solution to the problem.  Congress was not writing on a blank slate.  The 
Copyright Act of 1976 emerged against a backdrop of nearly 100 years of 
international copyright history, nearly 200 years of American copyright history, 
and nearly 300 years of English copyright history.  The work and the idea that the 
term represents have been part of the law since the beginning and have been 
incorporated into copyright systems around the world.  Whatever the work 
means today, that meaning has been shaped by copyright’s history and traditions, 
not just by Congress. 
 
B. The Work in History35  
The ordinary English word “work” is used and has been used in a number of 
different senses, all of which are relevant to copyright law, and all of which have 
been used at points in copyright history.  “Work” can be a verb (a sculptor works 
a block of marble, or an engraver works a plate). Any creator might work at his or 
her craft.  “Work” is more commonly encountered as a noun.  An artist might 
produce a painting, sometimes known as a “work of art” or as a “work of fine art,” 
in the sense that what the artist produced is fully co-extensive with the physical 
thing.  An author might produce a book, also known as a work. In that usage the 
word “work” might refer solely to the physical thing but might also refer to the 
creative content that is bound up in the book, that is, the text.  The author did not 
create the front matter or the index, perhaps.  These may or may not be part of 
the author’s work.  More than one work (in any of these nominal senses) might be 
combined into a single, plural work.  An artist may be said to have produced a 
body of work, by which we understand the artist produced a number of pieces 
that are, in the aggregate, treated as a single product.  Again, the term slips 
between intangible and tangible referents.  Legal usage today extends further 
than any of these, to capture the proposition that the work subject to copyright is 
solely and purely an intangible thing.  
As a description of creative or cultural production in the English language, 
the “work” goes back at least to the early seventeenth century, but the usage in 
that era often did not align with modern usage.  Ben Jonson’s writings were 
published in 1616 as The Works of Benjamin Jonson, but the title came in for 
criticism.  Some ridiculed the title as presumptuous:  “Pray tell me Ben, where 
doth the mystery lurke / what others call a play you call a work.”  Another rose to 
the publisher’s and Jonson’s defense:  “The author’s friend thus for the author 
says, / Ben’s plays are works, when other’s works are plays.” F36F  Migration of the 
                                                                                                                                     
35 This Section draws on Michael J. Madison, The End of the Work as We Know It, 
19 J. Intell. Prop. L. 325 (2012). 
36 The exchange is recounted in Ian Donaldson, Ben Jonson: A Life 326-27 
(2012). 
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term into copyright took a while. In Anglo-American copyright law, “the work” 
appeared in early statutory and judicial texts but did not come into common use 
until the latter part of the nineteenth century as a standard referent for the purely 
intangible subject or object of the rights of an author or copyright owner.  Even 
then, use of “the work” or the “copyrighted work” had more in common with the 
medium-specific character of older copyright law than the medium-independent 
law that we rely on today.F37 
The first federal copyright statute in the United States, of 1790, spoke of 
copyright in particular material forms: “maps, charts, and books.” F38F  Material 
form created the work, in a manner of speaking, although “the work” was not, as 
such, part of the law.  Today we speak of an author creating a work.  In the late 
eighteenth century, lawyers spoke of an author writing a book.  The work was the 
author’s labor or the artist’s craft or skill, represented in the material production.  
Works were tangible things.  The statutory revision of 1831 extended that 
framework, opening the door to copyright in work (not necessarily works) of a 
sort.  The 1831 act authorized copyright protection for “any book or books, map, 
chart, or musical composition, print, cut, or engraving.” F39F  In a separate section 
on renewals, the statute referred to the renewal term vesting in the “author, 
inventor, designer, engraver” of “the work.” F40F  In context, “the work” seems to 
refer to a relevant material form rather than to an intangible abstraction. The 
revision of 1870 added more references to “the work” as the object of copyright, 
though still in the context of a broader recitation of copyrightable subject matter 
specified by particular forms rather than by a single abstraction.  Copyrightable 
creativity was still largely defined by tangible context.  Under the 1870 statute, 
copyright applied to  
any book, map, chart, dramatic or musical composition, 
engraving, cut, print, or photograph or negative thereof, or 
of a painting, drawing, chromo, statue, statuary, and [ ] 
                                                                                                                                     
37 The term “work” was known in publishing, centuries ago, as a referent for a 
manuscript or a book.  Adrian Johns quotes Oldenburg, the seventeenth century 
publisher of the journal Philosophical Transactions, who objected to a translator’s name 
being printed on an edition of his book: “lest I should lose my good name, not being able 
to publish the work as I should like.”  Adrian Johns, The Nature of the Book: Print 
and Knowledge in the Making 518 (1998).  The abbreviated history in the text aligns 
with a history of the similar developments in Hughes, supra note 10, at 600–04, and with 
a longer account of the same period in Oren Bracha, The Ideology of Authorship 
Revisited: Authors, Markets, and Liberal Values in Early American Copyright, 118 Yale 
L.J. 186, 224–48 (2008). 
38 Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124. 
39 Act of February 3, 1831, § 1, 4 Stat. 436. 
40 Id. § 2. 
Michael J. Madison – IP Things as Boundary Objects –March 31, 2013 
 DRAFT:  Please do not cite or quote without the permission of the author.  
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
15 
models or designs intended to be perfected as works of the 
fine arts . . . . [A]uthors may reserve the right to dramatize or 
to translate their own works. F41 
  The Copyright Act of 1909 confirmed a significant shift in emphasis.  The 
new law spoke in terms of protection for “the copyrighted work,” completing a 
century-long transition from a wholesale statutory focus on particular material 
forms to a nearly-wholesale focus on a single, overarching intangible abstraction.  
In the words of the statute, “the works for which copyright may be secured under 
this title shall include all the writings of an author.” F42F The transition to 
abstraction was nearly but not entirely complete.  For the 1976 Copyright Act, 
Congress invented the phrase “original works of authorship,” finally and fully 
distinguishing the intangible work from its fixed form, in a phrase applicable to 
all authorship, but the step from the 1909 abstraction to its current form was a 
very short one.  The important conceptual shift, to the now-problematic and 
undefined term “work,” occurred roughly seventy-five years earlier. 
A related transition in copyright decisionmaking occurred in the late 
nineteenth century. Copyright courts in the U.S. had long focused on a work as a 
material product of an author’s or creator’s effort, but not necessarily on the work 
as an intangible abstraction.  To speak of the author’s work was to speak of a 
particular material production.F43F  For example, in Lawrence v. Dana,F44F a leading 
mid-century case, the court summarized the plaintiff’s position: 
Copyright is not the title of the author to his production. It is 
the statute monopoly [sic] to multiply copies of the 
book. . . . It attaches only to the book deposited.  Mrs. 
Wheaton’s copyright is the right to multiply copies of that 
complex work, consisting of the text, the notes of Wheaton, 
the notes of Lawrence, in their character of notes to 
Wheaton, with their connections and attachments thereto.  
Lawrence’s work was attaching addenda and corrigenda to 
such portion of the text as he thought proper, so that they 
should perform the function of a note to that text, and 
                                                                                                                                     
41 Act of July 8, 1870, § 86, 16 Stat. 198. 
42 Copyright Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 4, 35 Stat. 1075. 
43 Eaton Drone’s influential copyright treatise approached the subject this way, 
equating an author’s work with his “intellectual production.”  See Eaton S. Drone, A 
Treatise on the Law of Property in Intellectual Productions in Great Britain 
and the United States Embracing Copyright in Works of Literature and Art, 
and Playwright in Dramatic and Musical Compositions 1–8 (photo. reprint 1979) 
(Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1879). 
44 15 F. Cas. 26 (C.C. Mass. 1869). 
Michael J. Madison – IP Things as Boundary Objects –March 31, 2013 
 DRAFT:  Please do not cite or quote without the permission of the author.  
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
16 
nothing further.F45 
Scribner v. Stoddart,F46F not long afterward, equated the plaintiff’s “copyrighted 
work” with “the material publication” produced overseas by the plaintiff, a 
version of which was in the public domain in the United States but which had 
been reproduced without permission by the defendant.  The plaintiff sued for 
infringement.  Focus on the court’s use of the term “work” in the following 
passage (the court denied the requested injunction): 
To reproduce a foreign publication is not wrong. There may 
be differences of opinion about the morality of republishing 
here a work that is copyrighted abroad; but the public policy 
of this country, as respects the subject, is in favor of such 
republication.  It is supposed to have an influence upon the 
advance of learning and intelligence.  The defendants at the 
beginning could not know that before this work was 
completed and fully issued it would contain articles which 
were copyrighted.  They had seen previous editions of this 
work published, one after another, without any such 
obstacles being cast in the way of a reprint. F47 
The term “work” here bridges an older sense of a work as “material product of 
particular labor” and a newer sense a work as an “intangible original product.”  In 
the same spirit is Bullinger v. Mackey:F48 
I next notice the point made, that the plaintiff has not 
produced proper evidence to show himself the author or 
proprietor of his works, within the meaning of the copyright 
laws.  The argument here is, that no one but the plaintiff 
himself can legally establish the fact that the plan, 
arrangement and combination of his works originated in his 
brain.  But, there is evidence showing that the plaintiff, by 
his own labor and that of persons employed by him, and 
working under his direction, gathered together from various 
original sources the material of his book; that the 
manuscript in which the matter was arranged was partly in 
his handwriting; and that from the manuscript the work was 
printed for him at his expense.F49 
                                                                                                                                     
45 Id. at 37. 
46 21 F. Cas. 876 (C.C. Pa. 1879). 
47 Id. at 879. 
48 4 F. Cas. 649 (C.C.N.Y. 1879). 
49 Id. at 651. 
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By contrast, a case decided only a short time later, Gilmore v. Anderson,F50F 
borrowed the idea of the work, an intangible abstraction, as the object of the 
copyright owner’s exclusive rights.  The court wrote: “Section 4952 confers the 
‘sole liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing, completing, copying, executing, 
finishing, and vending,’ the work on complying with the provisions of that 
chapter.”F51F  The court modestly changed the text of the statute, which provided 
(at the time) that the relevant author, inventor, etc. had the “sole liberty of 
printing, reprinting, publishing, completing, copying, executing, finishing, and 
vending the same.”F52F  The antecedent of “the same,” in the statute, was “any 
book, map, chart, dramatic or musical composition, engraving, cut, print, or 
photograph or negative thereof, or of a painting, drawing, chromo, statue, 
statuary, and [ ] models or designs intended to be perfected as works of the fine 
arts.”F53F  For that text, the court substituted “the work.” 
 These cases are at most suggestive.  But what they suggest is that courts in 
the latter part of the nineteenth century were well on their way to characterizing 
the author’s work as an intangible abstraction, that is, as a particular yet 
immaterial thing.  That characterization was not necessarily differentiated clearly 
from treating the author’s work as a particular material item; in both senses the 
work was something made, or manufactured.  The two senses were, and remain, 
linked in ways that have been poorly articulated.  When and how can a work exist 
independently of the particular material form (if any) in which it was initially 
produced, and what is the sense of considering such a work independently of 
questions of originality?  I turn to those questions in Part III of this chapter.     
Scholars agree, however, that both judges and legislators in the late 1800s 
advanced a concept of the work, as something made, that divorced content from 
form.  In older copyright law, works were static things produced by the person or 
people that the law constituted authors.  Those things were, in practical terms, 
manufactures; calling them “works” was a subtle and indirect way to capture 
their necessary physicality.  The concept of authorship and the concept of the 
work as merchantable thing, a printed book, had to be linked during the 
seventeenth century before the idea of creative authorship  could be set free two 
hundred years later;54 it was not given that originality could be captured in print 
as well as in performance, and only slowly, in the era of Jonson and Shakespeare, 
were playwrights recognized as having cultural (i.e., authorial) interests in 
                                                                                                                                     
50 38 F. 846 (C.C.N.Y. 1889). 
51 Id. at 848. 
52 Act of July 8, 1870, § 86, 16 Stat. 198. 
53 Id. 
54 See Joseph Loewenstein, Ben Jonson and Possessive Authorship (2002) 
(describing the evolving relationship between performers and printers). 
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printed works that were at least equal to those of the actors and companies who 
performed plays.  Once authorship was packaged as a work, its thingness (the 
ambiguity here is intentional) was a resource to be exploited.  Scholarship on the 
emergence of the concept of “romantic authorship” during the nineteenth century 
demonstrates that reifying the intangible abstraction associated with the author’s 
production was part and parcel of a political strategy during the latter nineteenth 
century intended to expand and make concrete the idea of authors’ rights.  The 
author’s “work” no longer referred to the author’s labor, as it once had. F55F  The 
term became a vessel for justifications for copyright based on utilitarian 
concerns.F56F  Oren Bracha has made a compelling case for the underlying 
economic and political considerations driving this shift toward reification of “the 
work” alongside “the author”:  publishing interests that aimed to propertize an 
abstract version of an author’s intellectual production and capture an ever-
broader range of economic opportunities associated with what became “the 
work.”F57F   “The work” was a merchantable commodity; a book was the product of 
an author’s or printer’s craft.   
For all of that, the politics of the time focused on “the book,” with its echoes 
of materiality, as much as on the work. F58F  The Supreme Court in Burrow-Giles 
                                                                                                                                     
55 “Labour gives a man a natural right of property in that which he produces: literary 
compositions are the effect of labour; authors have therefore a natural right of property in 
their works.”  William Enfield, Observations on Literary Property 21 (1774), 
quoted in Mark Rose, Authors and Owners: The Invention of Copyright 85 
(1995). 
56 See Brad Sherman & Lionel Bently, The Making of Intellectual Property 
Law: The British Experience, 1760-1911 173-93(1999).  “[T]he law turned its 
attention away from the value of the labour embodied in the protected subject matter, to 
the value of the object itself: to the contribution that the particular object made to the 
reading public, the economy and so on.”  Id. at 173-74.  Sherman and Bently emphasize 
the role that registration systems played in this shift, not only in copyright but throughout 
intellectual property law.  My claim below regarding boundary objects, which may be 
extended beyond copyright works to inventions, designs, marks, and so on, suggests that 
the dynamic, boundary-making character of IP things continues despite registration 
practice. 
57 See Bracha, supra note 37, at 224–48. 
58 Johann Gottlieb Fichte, whose 1793 On the Illegality of Printing is credited with 
supplying much of the philosophical justification for recognizing an author’s intangible 
intellectual production, referred not to the work but to the book.  Johann Gottlieb Fichte, 
Beweis der Unrechtm¨abigkeit des B ¨uchernachdrucks. Ein R¨asonnement und eine 
Parabel [Proof of the Unlawfulness of Reprinting: A Rationale and a Parable], 21 
Berlinische Monaschrift 443, 443–87 (1793) (Martha Woodmansee trans., 2008), 
translated in Primary Sources on Copyright (1450–1900) (L. Bently & M. 
Kretschmer eds.), available at http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cgi-
bin/kleioc/0010/exec/ausgabe/%22d_1793%22.  On Fichte’s contribution to the 
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Lithographic Co. v. SaronyF59F wrote: 
An author in that sense is ‘he to whom anything owes its 
origin; originator; maker; one who completes a work of 
science or literature.’ … So, also, no one would now claim 
that the word ‘writing’ in this clause of the constitution, 
though the only word used as to subjects in regard to which 
authors are to be secured, is limited to the actual script of 
the author, and excludes books and all other printed matter.  
By writings in that clause is meant the literary productions 
of those authors, and congress very properly has declared 
these to include all forms of writing, printing, engravings, 
etchings, etc., by which the ideas in the mind of the author 
are given visible expression. F60 
As the book gave way to the work, and as the work as an abstraction seemingly 
became more “property-like” to suit the needs of emerging industrial markets, 
the work as a thing became less bounded, or (to some) less property-like.  The 
abstract version of the work emptied the legal system of the one resource, 
creativity bound to tangible things in context, that might have provided a more or 
less unambiguous, limiting definition of the work.   
International copyright developments reflect the same themes.  The abstract 
work took on a leading role in the architecture of international copyright at 
precisely the same time that the concept of the work was being deprived by 
American courts and Congress of material or tangible constraints.  The Berne 
Convention, signed in initial form in 1886, specified the subject matter of the 
                                                                                                                                     
development of nineteenth century copyright, see, e.g., Maurizio Borghi, Owning Form, 
Sharing Content: Natural-Right Copyright and Digital Environment, in 5 New 
Directions in Copyright Law 197 (Fiona Macmillan ed., 2007) (describing the 
contribution of natural law to understanding the work). 
59 111 U.S. 53 (1884). 
60 Id. at 57–58.  The citation to Worcester is not explained in the text of the opinion 
but likely refers to A Dictionary of the English Language, a leading dictionary first 
published in 1860 by Joseph Emerson Worcester.  Dictionaries can tell us only so much 
about usage, particularly dictionaries from the 19th century, when lexicographic practices 
were still evolving.  Worcester is instructive nonetheless, as relevant definitions changed 
over time.  See HJoseph E. WorcesterH, A Universal and Critical Dictionary of the 
English Language (1854) (defining “author” as “[a] writer of a literary or scientific 
work; a writer,” among other things, and “work” as “[t]he product of the labor of the 
hands or of the mind; a literary production; a performance; a piece of mechanism; any 
fabric; any thing made.”).  Worcester’s first dictionary was both more cryptic and less 
abstract.  J.E. Worcester, A Comprehensive Pronouncing and Explanatory 
Dictionary of the English Language (1830) (defining “[a]uthor” as “[t]he writer or 
composer of a book,” and “work,” as a noun, as “toil; labor; a performance”). 
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Berne Union as “la protection des droits des auteurs sur leurs oeuvres littéraires 
et artistiques,” or “the protection of the rights of authors in their literary and 
artistic works.”F61F  British copyright law since 1911 has applied to “every original 
literary, dramatic, musical, and artistic work.”F62F  French copyright law governs 
the author’s œuvre de l’esprit, “all works of the mind.”F63F  
The French œuvre for the noun “work,” an object or thing, can be compared 
with a word not chosen: travail, which also means the noun “work,” but which 
evokes the effort, skill, and labor associated with producing something.  Œuvre is 
the thing produced; travail is the job or effort undertaken to produce it.  One 
might say that the course of nineteenth century was the course of shifting the 
law’s focus from the latter to the former.  American copyright law today looks 
back on more than 200 years of evolution of the concepts of work and the work, 
during which those concepts evolved in broad terms from the idea of a stable, 
material referent to an apparently unbounded, undefined abstraction.  The 
French œuvre has migrated to English as oeuvre, commonly defined as the works 
of a writer, painter, or other creator, taken as a whole, or any one of those works.  
The work has become one word and one concept, applicable to a multiplicity of 
authors, authorship, readers, consumers, merchants, and creative things.    
 
III.  The Work as Boundary Object 
Some and perhaps much of that point has been made by others.  Here, I part 
ways with those who suggest that the way forward is to embrace the ineffable 
dynamism of intangible creativity blended with materiality, that is, to focus 
entirely on interests rather than on things.  (One version of that argument points 
to the work as co-extensive with the author’s expression.)  I also set to the side 
arguments that try to impose specific and detailed limits on the work where none 
spring forth in the first instance.  (One version of that argument points to the 
work as limited in all cases to the literal expression produced by the author.)   
Instead, as I noted in the Introduction, analysis of the work should be attentive to 
                                                                                                                                     
61 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 828 
U.N.T.S. 221, art. 1 (Sept. 9, 1886). 
62 See Copyright Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 46, § 1(1) (Eng.). 
63 See Code de la propriété intellectuelle, art. L111-1 (“L’auteur d’une oeuvre de 
l’esprit jouit sur cette oeuvre, du seul fait de sa création, d’un droit de propriété 
incorporelle exclusif et opposable à tous.”).  French copyright statutes from the earlier 
part of the nineteenth century referred in translation to the works of an author, but the 
original French is ouvrages, which more likely points to a tangible product of an artist or 
artisan.  See Loi 3869 du 28 Mars 1852 rapport et décret sur la contrefaçon d’ouvrages 
étrangers [Law 3869 of March 28, 1852 on the Report and Decree on the Counterfeiting 
of Foreign Works], Bulletin Des Lois De La République Française [Bulletin of 
Laws Of The French Republic], No. 510. 
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the multiple uses of the work in copyright–functional, expressive, and 
communicative–and to the role that the idea of the work plays as a kind of 
boundary itself, rather than being defined by boundaries.   My claim in the 
remainder of this chapter is that the work should be considered a source, rather 
than a product, of boundary-making and governing.   
It would be a mistake to invest the idea of boundaries, even as I have referred 
to them, with an over-arching sense of rigidity or solidity.  To the contrary:  the 
very de-materialized character of the work is fundamental to its modern service. 
All of the boundaries that I describe below, all the uses to which the work is put in 
copyright practice, are and should be porous.  Their porosity is the point.  (The 
porosity or permeability of boundaries, in service of one or more other interests, 
is a central theme of the work of Michel Foucault, among others.  But nothing in 
my argument turns on Foucault’s influence.)  The work both can and should be 
flexible.F64F  But flexible does not and should not mean purely open-ended.  
Copyright scholars publicly celebrate and privately bemoan the unhelpfully 
unlimited “patterns of generality” analysis used by Judge Learned Hand to 
identify the core of an author’s protectable copyright interest.F65F  Those patterns 
might be helpfully re-cast as boundaries.  Of particular interest here is the work 
of Leigh Star, with different co-authors, identifying the concept of the boundary 
object: 
This is an analytic concept of those scientific objects which 
both inhabit several intersecting social worlds (see the list of 
examples in the previous section) and satisfy the 
informational requirements of each of them.  Boundary 
objects are objects which are both plastic enough to adapt to 
local needs and the constraints of the several parties 
employing them, yet robust enough to maintain a common 
identity across sites.  They are weakly structured in common 
use, and become strongly structured in individual-site use.  
These objects may be abstract or concrete.  They have 
different meanings in different social worlds but their 
structure is common enough to more than one world to 
make them recognizable, a means of translation.  The 
                                                                                                                                     
64 See Madison, supra note 2, at 386–87. 
65 Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).  Judge Hand 
wrote:  “Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns of 
increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident is left out. The 
last may perhaps be no more than the most general statement of what the play is about, 
and at times might consist only of its title; but there is a point in this series of abstractions 
where they are no longer protected, since otherwise the playwright could prevent the use 
of his "ideas," to which, apart from their expression, his property is never extended.” Id. 
at 121. 
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creation and management of boundary objects is a key 
process in developing and maintaining coherence across 
intersecting social worlds.F66F   
It is possible, even likely, that the idea of the work in copyright practice is a 
boundary object within the above definition: Both the work in general and works 
in specific cases are things that bridge communities weakly in abstract terms, that 
permit adjacent communities to collaborate, cooperate, or co-exist, and whose 
flexibility allows a degree of coordinated but independent action within each 
community.  Works are boundary objects that enable the expression of the 
multiple values that imbue copyright law, and that enable social and cultural 
values to be sustained in a legal system that is focused, nominally, on claims by 
individuals.   
In other words, courts’ treatment of the work in different factual and legal 
settings suggests strongly that the work has a weak abstract character that 
permits it to translate relationships between nearby communities or practices.  I 
suggest that those adjacent communities or practices are defined largely by two 
paradigms of exchange of copyright things, which at times complement and at 
times compete with each other:  market exchange and gift exchange.F67F  Market 
exchange, or reciprocal exchange, is the domain of the copyright owner’s 
exclusive rights, commodities traded in public and publicly-enforceable 
transactions between abstracted “parties.”  It is defined principally by fixation, by 
                                                                                                                                     
66 See Susan Leigh Star & James R. Griesemer, Institutional Ecology, ‘Translations’ 
and Boundary Objects: Amateurs and Professionals in Berkeley’s Museum of Vertebrate 
Zoology, 1907-1939, 19 Social Stud. Sci. 387, 393 (1989) (footnotes omitted).  On the 
meaning and roles of boundary objects, see Geoffrey C. Bowker & Susan Leigh Star, 
Sorting Things Out: Classification and its Consequences 296–98 (1999).  A good 
example of the application of the boundary object concept to a particular form of 
intellectual production is Corynne McSherry, Who Owns Academic Work?:  
Battling for Control of Intellectual Property (2001).  Aside from the work of 
Corynne McSherry, the boundary object literature is not well-integrated into the legal 
literature.  A notable exception is the scholarship of Dan Burk.  He correctly points out 
that boundary objects have politics, which must be accounted for in any application of the 
concept to law.  See Dan L. Burk, Feminism and Dualism in Intellectual Property, 15 Am. 
U. J. Gender Soc. Pol’y & L. 183 (2007).  
67 On the logics of gift economies, see generally Warren Hagstrom, Gift Giving as an 
Organizing Principle in Science, in Science in Context: Readings in the Sociology 
of Science 21 (Barry Barnes & David Edge, eds., 1982); Warren O. Hagstrom, The 
Scientific Community 12-13 (1965); Lewis Hyde, The Gift: Imagination and the 
Erotic Life of Property 60-61, 150-58, 190-94 (1979).  The idea of collective or 
communal (i.e., non-market) sharing in copyright contexts has been discussed in Wendy 
J. Gordon, Fair Use Markets: On Weighing Potential License Fees, 79 Geo. Wash. L. 
Rev. 1814, 1823 (2011); Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 
45 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1525, 1677-87 (2004). 
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static construction, by finality of authorship, by discreteness of objects, by 
consumption, by expression or specificity, by sameness, and by the idea of 
manufacture.  Gift exchange, by which I refer not specifically to gifts but instead 
to non-reciprocal sharing, is the domain of successor generations, of privateness, 
privacy, and family or other trusted groups, of performance and of the public 
domain, and of exceptions and limitations on the copyright owner’s exclusive 
rights, where material is shared rather than transacted.  It is defined principally 
by fluidity and dynamism, by experience rather than consumption, by continuity 
of creation, by flow rather than fixity, by idea or generality, by novelty, and by the 
idea of nature.   Market and gift do not signify “things” and “no things,” either 
literally or metaphorically; rather they signify different ways by which things are 
created, represented, and used. 
These characterizations are, in both cases, broad and in certain respects 
overly broad concepts.  At best they represent intersecting and overlapping poles 
on the broad market/gift continuum, helpful guideposts to what follows. In 
concrete institutional settings, they must often be blended.  An obvious 
complexity here is that the intangible features of copyrighted works are, as 
economists teach, nondepletable and nonrival.  Copyright things can be in more 
than one place at one time, and sometimes, because of the cumulative character 
of much creative practice, they not only are in both places at once, but often, they 
must be.  Expression requires idea.  Yet the two poles capture many of the ways 
in which the work in copyright “works” in practice:  the work (or a work) divides 
one kind of market economy (copyright, patent, tangible property, and so on) 
from another, and the work (or a work) divides market economies (exclusive 
rights in IP) from gift economies (no rights, or exceptions to IP rights).  It is both 
possible and sensible to examine these distinctions as boundary domains both in 
any particular instance, that is, with respect to the treatment and characterization 
of any particular work as a boundary object, and in general, that is, with respect 
to the concept of the work in general as a boundary object.  And it is possible, 
sensible, and even essential to examine the distinction operating in multiple ways 
within a given work.  The point is not that some works belong in the sphere of 
commerce and that other works belong in the sphere of sharing, or gifts.  The 
point is that what courts and commentators call the work is an object within 
which, by which, and through which various attributes, functions, and symbols of 
cultural practice are assigned not only to individuals but also to loosely-bounded 
places, spaces, times, and groups.  
I illustrate the proposition that works create and govern boundaries, as 
boundary objects, using examples from recent American judicial practice.  I 
noted at the outset that digital technologies have made the challenges of the work 
more pronounced, but digital technology did not create them, and it is possible to 
expand several of the illustrations below with added older cases.   
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A. Platonism:  Original Works and New Works 
There are cases that begin with and then test the intuitive, naive idea of the 
work as a static thing, defined by boundaries (even if those boundaries 
themselves are not necessarily specified).  The idea of work in this sense is at 
times grounded in, or the boundaries of the work are defined by, a sense of the 
Platonic or prototypical ideal of a given work, or what Paul Goldstein has 
characterized as the “ur-work.”F68F Copyright in these contexts attaches to a 
“canonical” version of the work, and for purposes of infringement by substantial 
similarity, or for purposes of identifying a creatively distinct derivative work, the 
second work is compared with its “canonical” predecessor.  Character copyrights 
are particularly subject to this problem and to the Platonic-work-based solution, 
both where the copyright attaches to a fictional character as such as well as to a 
particular graphic representation of that character.  The work as boundary object 
manages the intersections of markets. 
A character representation case illustrates.  In Entertainment Research 
Group, Inc. v. Genesis Creative Group, Inc.,F69F the defendant was accused of 
infringing the plaintiff’s copyrights in three-dimensional costume versions of 
famous advertising cartoon characters, such as the Pillsbury Doughboy, Geoffrey 
the Giraffe, and Cap‘n Crunch.  The copyrights were valid, if at all, if the costumes 
constituted derivative works, that is, original adaptations of the underlying, two-
dimensional copyrighted characters.  The court decided that the costumes were 
not derivative works. Any variations between the two-dimensional and three-
dimensional versions of the characters were dictated wholly by functional 
considerations rather than creative judgments.  Each character copyright related 
not to its particular physical manifestation but instead to a single canonical 
creative work, which was then represented in any number of forms and media—
including both two-dimensional and three-dimensional versions.  The court 
noted: 
[N]o reasonable trier of fact would see anything but the 
underlying copyrighted character when looking at ERG’s 
costumes. . . . [B]ecause ERG’s costumes are “instantly 
identifiable as embodiments” of the underlying copyrighted 
characters in “yet another form,” no reasonable juror could 
conclude that there are any “non-trivial” artistic differences 
between the underlying cartoon characters and the 
immediately recognizable costumes that ERG has designed 
                                                                                                                                     
68 See Goldstein, supra note 10, at 1182–83 (discussing the idea in the context of 
Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 897 F.2d 565 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). 
69 122 F.3d 1211 (9th Cir. 1997). 
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and manufactured.F70 
This kind of clean division between work and copy, or content and form, is the 
purest version of the work in legal action.   
 The point of the bounded, defined work here is not to define the work in the 
abstract.  The boundary is not solely inward-looking (what is the content of the 
work?); it is outward-looking.  The work is defined relative to its context, which 
usually means its business or market context.  That perspective begins with the 
standard question, what is the distinction between this work and the accused 
work?  It continues:  What is the role of this work in the context of other works, 
either similar (or dissimilar) narratives that feature the character work, or 
sequels and other adaptations of the original narrative work.  A single film or 
novel may turn out to contain numerous works:  the narrative or principal plot, 
undisclosed or partially disclosed but emergent sub-plots, the principal 
characters, and descendants, dependents, and new versions of those characters.  
Yet none of those must be separately identified as a work when that initial film or 
novel is created; none of them has a pure or Platonic form either initially or later.  
Added works, or variations on the same work, usually emerge as the initial 
product is commercialized – or pirated.   
 The idea of the work here serves multiple goals.  The first is obvious:  to 
identify a boundary between sameness or identity, on the one hand, and the 
changed and the new, on the other hand.  Or, what is “mine” (referring to the 
copyright owner) and what is “other” – that is, ours, or no one’s.  On one side of 
the line (identity) lies copyright infringement.  On the other side (difference) lies 
a new work, or perhaps nothing (that is, no thing) at all.  The second, perhaps 
more important goals are to divide the copyright market defined by the work as 
marketable commodity from the rest of culture, where changed versions of the 
work are freely shareable, and to bound the copyright market defined by the 
initial work from copyright markets defined by other versions of that work or by 
adaptations or excerpts from that work – which may be, in themselves, distinct 
works.  The idea of the work constructs the market in general, and distinct and 
different markets in particular.  It defines the author’s market and existence of 
domains beyond that market, which may in turn be defined and organized in 
terms of distinct markets (each distinguishable variation on a source work may 
become a new, marketable work) or not (so that each distinguishable variation is, 
in effect, un-owned).  With each new commodity comes a new market or markets, 
institution, or set of practices, each bounded lightly and, given the necessarily 
                                                                                                                                     
70 Id. at 1223 (quoting Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 908–09 
(2d Cir. 1980)).  In very much the same spirit is Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 897 F.2d 565 
(D.C. Cir. 1990), discussed in Goldstein, supra note 10, at 1182–83. 
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somewhat loose understanding of the idea of a market,71 by the work itself. 
 
B.  Incomplete Works:  Authors and Institutions 
The idea of “the work” can tell us when a work is a “work” worthy of 
copyright contemplation, or is instead a draft, sketch, or idea.  In this sense, the 
work defines the trigger of copyright. Before something becomes a work, 
copyright law does not apply; the material is preliminary and therefore freely 
shareable, used and experienced.  Justin Hughes pursues this reasoning, in part, 
when he argues that copyright law should not protect “microworks” because they 
are not works.F72F  (One might simply invoke the maxim de minimis non curat lex: 
The law does not concern itself with trifles.)  In a related sense, a creative thing 
may emerge as a work from early or unformed effort, and in doing so it crosses a 
kind of copyright boundary.  As a boundary object, a copyright work sits at an 
intersection between complete control of the thing vested in its creator, on the 
one hand, to governance of the thing managed by a complex that includes not 
only the creator but also other individual, institutional, and collective interests, 
on the other. 
  An art world case illustrates.  In Massachusetts Museum Of Contemporary 
Art Foundation, Inc. v. Büchel,F73F the plaintiff Christophe Büchel was a 
conceptual artist who commissioned the defendant, the Massachusetts Museum 
of Contemporary Art (MassMoCA), to install a large, complex, and expensive 
conceptual sculpture.  MassMoCA agreed to bear the expense of the installation.  
The parties’ contract failed, however, to provide sufficient detail regarding the 
project’s final scope.  During installation, Büchel made substantial changes to its 
scope.  Fearing that it would never recoup its installation expense via admission 
charges or otherwise, MassMoCA eventually suspended additional effort and 
opened the incomplete installation to public viewing.  MassMoCA included 
signage making it clear to patrons that the sculpture on display was not the 
completed work of the artist.  Büchel nonetheless sued, both under the relevant 
provisions of the Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA), Section 106A of the Copyright 
Act,F74F for violations of his rights to integrity and attribution, and also under the 
public display portion of Section 106 of the Copyright Act.   
With respect to both claims, MassMoCA argued that Büchel had not proved 
                                                                                                                                     
71 See Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Is Pepsi Really a Substitute for Coke? 
Market Definition in Antitrust and IP, 100 Geo. L.J. 2055 (2012). 
72 See Hughes, supra note 10 (discussing and rejecting the modern trend toward 
protection of “microworks”). 
73 593 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2010). 
74 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012). 
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the existence of a work that triggered any obligations under copyright law.  As 
Büchel himself acknowledged, from the artist’s point of view the work of art here 
consisted of a specific kind of patrons’ visual and physical experience of the 
creation.F75F To MassMoCA, the presence or absence of a work was a kind of 
jurisdictional boundary. Until an author is done creating, copyright law is 
irrelevant.F76F On this reasoning, an unfinished sculpture is not a work.  The 
district court agreed, but the court of appeals did not.  The latter court relied on 
the copyright statute’s definition of “created,” which applies, it held, to 
unfinished works.F77F   It held that Büchel’s work fell within the scope of VARA as a 
“work of visual art.” 
 Form matters, one might simply say.  The appellate court’s interpretation of 
the statute almost certainly is incorrect if the idea of the work is to be 
independent of fixation, and if there is any jurisdictional boundary between 
creativity to which copyright attaches and creativity that lies outside of it. F78F  Of 
course, such a boundary may not exist, which means that the court was correct 
after all.  Cases on protection of “small” works, some of which started (and 
remained) small and some of which were small slices of larger creations, are 
divided.  In some cases, any evidence of an author’s creativity, no matter how 
small or preliminary, justifies copyright protection.  The salient cases come from 
the arena of digital technology.  In Tin Pan Apple Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co.,F79F 
the court declined to hold, as a matter of law, that the defendant's digital 
sampling of the lyrics “Hugga-Hugga” and “Brr” from the plaintiff’s copyrighted 
recording constituted copying of noncopyrightable material.  If a single guttural 
syllable may constitute a work, then it might be said that anything may constitute 
a work.  Some courts resist that conclusion.  In Newton v. Diamond,F80F the court 
concluded that unauthorized copying of a six-second, three-note sequence of the 
plaintiff’s musical composition appropriated a part of the plaintiff’s work that was 
simply too small to matter.F81F  In Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, 
                                                                                                                                     
75 See MassMoCA’s Lawsuit, The ART Law Blog, 
http://theartlawblog.blogspot.com/2007/05/mass-mocas-lawsuit.html (May 27, 2007) 
(blog post written by Büchel’s counsel). 
76 Before the 1976 Copyright Act took effect, this was indeed the case.  With few 
exceptions, copyright applied only to published works. 
77 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining “created”). 
78 The statute clearly applies to things that are completed in pieces, such as 
movements of a symphony or chapters of a novel.  It is less clear that the statute applies, 
or should apply, to every successful stroke of a pen or brush. 
79 88 Civ. 4085 (CSH), 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2178 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 1994). 
80 388 F.3d 1189, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004). 
81 Newton also illustrates a different kind of boundary, between the domain of 
musical composition, or songwriting, and the related domain of performance and 
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Inc.,F82F the supplier of digital video recording (DVR) services was held not to have 
infringed the plaintiff’s copyrighted audio-visual works, where the copies made 
via the DVR technology were stored for 1.2 seconds apiece.  These were whole 
copies, but brief copies.  Neither of these cases turned on the idea of the work 
itself, but the idea of the work as a boundary, between creativity that matters for 
copyright purposes and creativity that does not, seems very much to have 
animated the courts’ judgments.F83 
The boundary management going on in all of these cases, but especially in 
Büchel , is not merely a boundary of form.  The fact that Büchel sued under 
VARA, the limited version of moral rights protection available under American 
copyright law, suggests that more was going on in the case, and more was at stake 
with the work, than the functional delineation of the author’s economic rights 
according to the presence or absence of a work.  The work as boundary objects 
manages intersections between the practices and expectations of artists and 
authors, on the one hand, and the practices and expectations of other claimants 
and institutions, on the other.  That boundary exists in at least two senses.  First, 
from a moral rights standpoint, a work – Büchel’s work – bears the imprint of the 
author himself or herself,F84F and it might be said, metaphorically, that the 
boundary defined by the work represents the boundary between the author as a 
whole person or personality, on the one hand, and a non-person, or the 
undifferentiated world of readers, viewers, and listeners, on the other.  Before a 
collection of materials reaches the status of “work,” that collection is simply stuff, 
at most the subject matter of chattel property law, but nothing more.85  To 
                                                                                                                                     
recording.  The defendants, the celebrated rap group the Beastie Boys, used a sample of a 
recorded flute performance by the noted flutist James Newton.  They had cleared the 
rights to the recorded performance of Newton’s work (owned not by Newton but instead 
by ECM Records) but had not cleared the rights to the underlying musical composition. 
The three-note sequence from the composition that the court dismissed as unworthy of 
copyright was arguably quite creative – but only in its performed, recorded version.  Art 
forms closely bound up with performance, such as music, drama, and sport, are filled 
with copyright works that can be productively analyzed as boundary objects.  As in 
Newton, some dimensions of these fields are recognized culturally as copyright works; 
many are not. 
82 536 F.3d 121, 127 (2d Cir. 2008). 
83 In Cartoon Network, the court’s rejection of liability for public performance by 
the DVR supplier turned on the question of whether the copies of the television programs 
stored by the defendant constituted one work (“performance,” in the language of the 
relevant statute), produced by the copyright owner, stored in multiple copies, or multiple 
performances, each stored once at the request of the DVR subscriber.  The court followed 
the latter path, in effect equating a work with a copy. 
84 See Borghi, supra note 58. 
85 In Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2000). a commercial 
Michael J. Madison – IP Things as Boundary Objects –March 31, 2013 
 DRAFT:  Please do not cite or quote without the permission of the author.  
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
29 
recognize a work in Büchel’s sculpture was to recognize the whole of Büchel 
himself.  This kind of boundary is present in other non-VARA moral rights cases 
in the U.S., notably Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Companies,F86F in which 
the integrity of the work qua work stands in for the integrity of the authors 
themselves.  
The work is a boundary object in a second sense.  Also present in the work 
are the interests and claims of the institutions of the art world, embodied in the 
particular case by MassMoCA.  Curators, museum directors, board members, 
investors, donors, and museum patrons all have interests in the collection, 
curation, and presentation of the art works that make up each museum’s 
collection.  Those interests, and legal and normative duties that accompany them, 
attach when works are formally part of the museum’s collection and not before.87 
Many of those interests are represented legally and normatively in property 
terms.  Art institutions are bound not to deaccession works of art from their 
collections except under specific circumstances.  Museums and their agents may 
not act purely in market terms.  Having accepted these works as gifts, in many 
cases, museums undertake to care for them in part according to a trust 
relationship with society as a whole,88 a relationship that aligns these institutions 
with the norms of gift exchange.  Once a gift, always a gift, in a manner of 
speaking; to convert a gift into a marketable commodity is to violate the norms of 
gift-giving.  When a work becomes formalized in the collection of a museum, 
therefore, the author’s interest is not erased, but it is recontextualized in the 
context of the institution.  The concept of the work in MassMoCA and in the 
context of the art world in general permits those two communities – artists, on 
                                                                                                                                     
photographer who had prepared photographs of a distinctive vodka bottle for 
advertisements sued his client, alleging that the client had rejected the photographs and 
procured and used virtually identical, infringing photographs from a different 
photographer.  The defendant argued, among other things, that the plaintiff’s copyrights 
were invalid because they constituted derivative works and as such were not original 
when judged in comparison with the source object—the bottle itself.  In this case, the 
court used the copyright statute’s definition of derivative works to interpose the concept 
of the work as a boundary between creative objects and everyday objects.  In this case, the 
bottle, the court ruled, was an ordinary (if attractive) utilitarian object, possessing no 
originality or creativity aside from its use as a bottle.  It was therefore not a work at all 
within the meaning of the law, and because it was not a work, photographs of the bottle 
could not be derivative works.  The photographs were to be judged copyrightable under 
the usual standard applicable to any claimed work of authorship.   
86 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976). 
87 For more on the intersection of copyright law and curatorial interests, see Michael 
J. Madison, Knowledge Curation, 86 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1957 (2011),  
88 See Sue Chen, Art Deaccessions and the Limits of Fiduciary Duty, 14 Art 
Antiquity & L. 103 (2009). 
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the one hand, and art institutions, on the other hand – to interact constructively, 
if not always without disagreeing. 
 
C.  Fixity:  Objects and Works 
In each of the first two illustrations, the work as boundary object in effect 
keeps some material and things inside copyright, and therefore inside the world 
of markets, commodities, and exchange, and excludes other material, leaving it 
either to the world of non-copyright institutions, such as markets for chattel 
property, or art institutions, or to no markets at all.  The point of the boundary 
object construct, however, is that this divide is at best fluid rather than absolute.  
It may be exclusionary with respect to material challenged in a particular case, or 
it may be inclusionary. 
 Software licensing provides the clearest example of this boundary principle 
in action via the copyright work.  Software producers have learned to draft their 
license agreements in ways that permit them to capture copyright-based 
ownership of copies of their works as objects, knowingly conflating the modern 
copyright distinction between the copyrighted work and the tangible copy.89F  The 
result is that consumers of copies of copyrighted computer programs acquire 
their copies as mere “licensees” rather than as owners.  The practical impact can 
be dramatic; “licensees” do not have the same power as owners to re-sell copies of 
copyrighted works in their possession.  For example, in Vernor v. Autodesk, 
Inc.,F90F the plaintiff bought several packages (tangible copies) of high-priced 
copyrighted computer software produced by the software developer Autodesk.  
He bought them not from Autodesk but from customers of Autodesk, and in this 
declaratory judgment action he sought confirmation of his right to re-sell the 
packages free of the resale restrictions that Autodesk imposes on its direct 
customers as part of the license agreement that accompanies each copy of 
Autodesk’s products.  That is, the plaintiff argued that he was an owner of his 
copies of Autodesk’s software and was privileged to re-sell them under the 
doctrine of first sale,F91F despite Autodesk’s exclusive right to distribute copies of 
the work under Section 106(3) of the Copyright Act. F92F  The district court agreed 
with the plaintiff, but the court of appeals reversed.  Vernor, the plaintiff, did not 
own his copies because the Autodesk customers who sold their copies to him 
were not, themselves, owners.  They were licensees, not entitled to the benefit of 
                                                                                                                                     
89 See Michael J. Madison, Reconstructing the Software License, 35 Loy. U. Chi. 
L.J. 275 (2003). 
90 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010).   
91 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012). 
92 Id. § 106(3). 
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the first sale doctrine. 
The crux of the case was Autodesk’s (and the court’s) blending of the idea of 
the work and the idea of the copy in the license agreement that Autodesk 
included with each package.  As the court of appeals described the agreement 
between Autodesk and its customers, the agreement 
recites that Autodesk retains title to all copies. Second, it 
states that the customer has a nonexclusive and 
nontransferable license to use Release 14.  Third, it imposes 
transfer restrictions, prohibiting customers from renting, 
leasing, or transferring the software without Autodesk’s 
prior consent and from electronically or physically 
transferring the software out of the Western Hemisphere.  
Fourth, it imposes significant use restrictions . . . .F93 
The text of the agreement, as quoted elsewhere in the opinion, makes clear that 
the agreement pertains to the Autodesk computer program (“Release 14”), 
sometimes referred to as “the Software” (the particular version or release of a 
particular Autodesk program).F94F  If one applies the copyright distinction between 
the work and one or more copies that embody the work, to which does the license 
pertain?  Is Autodesk licensing the work, or the copy?  The history of software 
licensing teaches that licensing the copyright in the work was originally the goal 
of software developers: to control the use of the work by customers who would 
otherwise be able to exploit the work by reproducing it in unexpected ways and 
settings.F95F  But Autodesk’s license, like many modern software agreements, is not 
so narrowly or carefully drawn, and the court simply failed to ask whether “the 
Software” referred to the work or to the copy.  If the agreement were construed as 
referring to the work, then Vernor, the plaintiff, would have been on relatively 
safe ground. Autodesk’s customers would have been “owners” of their copies and 
therefore entitled to re-sell those copies to Vernor, who could re-sell them again.  
The court assumed, instead, that the agreement referred to both the work and the 
copy.  The idea of the work was not given an opportunity to perform the limiting 
function that it might have done.  Instead, the idea of the work expanded the 
rights of the copyright owner.  Autodesk and other software companies were 
given the power to control resale markets for copies of their works in ways that 
few other manufacturers can, and in ways that are strikingly inconsistent with the 
operation of resale markets for copies of virtually all non-digital copyrighted 
                                                                                                                                     
93 Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1104. 
94 See id.  
95 See Madison, supra note 89, at 310–16; see also Madison, Notes, supra note 6. 
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works.F96 
To be fair to Autodesk and the software industry, drawing a classic 
distinction between the work and the copy in the context of digital products is 
difficult, even if the copyright statute specifies different legal rights with respect 
to each oneF97F  What a boundary between work and copy would mean in the digital 
context is a hugely problematic question.  The work is by definition an intangible, 
an abstraction; for all practical purposes a digital product (whether a computer 
program or a digital version of some other creative work) is likewise an 
intangible, an abstraction.  For an analog copy of a work, the distinction between 
the work and the copy is the distinction between thoughts (work) and atoms 
(copy).  Physics determines the identity of the copy, for a person can touch the 
copy (or see it, or hear it).  For a digital “copy,” the distinction is wholly arbitrary; 
the copy can be touched (or seen, or heard) but under circumstances that 
reinforce the intangible character of the work.  Although a computer program 
resides in computer memory, which means that some physical substrate for the 
program resides somewhere, it progresses to human experience and 
understanding only via the application of other computer programs.  Intangibles 
operate on intangibles in ways and in places that correspond poorly even to our 
experience of works reproduced or interpreted by analog technologies, such as 
film-based photography.  At the least, with computer programs the difficulty in 
distinguishing works and copies leads to an enormous amount of analytic 
confusion; at worst it leads to efforts to conflate the scope of legal rights attached 
to works and to copies.98    In a particular case, such as Vernor, the boundary 
                                                                                                                                     
96 See, e.g., Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc ., 568 U.S. ___ (2013) (applying the 
doctrine of first sale to copies manufactured abroad with the permission of a U.S. 
copyright owner, and re-sold in the U.S.); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 628 F.3d 
1175 (9th Cir. 2011) (addressing re-sale rights regarding promotional copies of compact 
discs).  The doctrine of first sale in American copyright law is closely related to the 
concept of exhaustion, which has been held to apply to copies of computer programs 
distributed in the European Union.  Case C-128/11, UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle 
International Corp., 2012 E.C.R. I-0000. 
97 See Borghi, supra note 58.  Cf. supra note 83 and accompanying text (describing 
the holding in the Cartoon Network litigation).  A computer program can be reduced to 
its digits – the particular sequence of 1’s and 0’s that constitute its binary form – but that 
binary or executable copy no more defines the limits of the work embodied in that 
program than the words of a novel define the limits of the novelist’s copyright. 
98 See Madison, Notes, supra note 6.  In the so-called digital “space,” the boundary 
between work and thing has an important additional dimension in the context of the anti-
circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).  The term 
“work” is used twice, in both parts of the statute, but refers to different things in each 
place.  In Section 1201(a), prohibiting circumvention of technological protection 
measures that control access to a work, “work” appears to refer to a particular material 
copy of a work.  In Section 1201(b)(1)(A), prohibiting trafficking in technology that is 
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object that comprises the work may be a matter of the author’s unilateral 
designation, the purchaser’s or owner’s appropriation, or public policy.  From the 
perspective of distinctions between tangible things and intangible works, what 
works and material are within the copyright system, and what lies beyond it, is 
nearly impossible to determine in general and can be processed in the particular 
case, using the concept of the work itself, only with great difficulty. 
 
D.  Multiciplicity: One Work or Many Works 
I argued above, in the context of partially completed art works, that the idea 
of the work at times expresses what might be called a finality interest, or a 
boundary between a continuing process on the one hand, in which the author or 
others wait until after the fact of creation to determine what is and what is not a 
work, and a finished, even independent, product, on the other hand.  Yet courts 
do not consistently apply a principle that bars changes to the identity of a work 
after the act of creation is complete or that forces a copyright owner, or anyone 
else, consistently to choose one characterization or another.  There are additional 
                                                                                                                                     
intended to be used in circumvention rights control measures with respect to a work, 
“work” appears to refer to the intangible work of authorship to which the copyright 
owner’s rights attach.  For extensive discussion and confusion on this point, see MDY 
Industries, LLC v. Blizzard Entertainment, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 944–48 (9th Cir. 2010), 
opinion amended and superseded on denial of rehearing by MDY Industries, LLC v. 
Blizzard Entertainment, Inc., 2011 WL 538748 (9th Cir. Feb 17, 2011).  The Federal 
Circuit’s construction of these sections tries to harmonize them, in a way that is not 
motivated by a single reading of the term “work” but that offers the advantage of that 
term’s being used consistently in both Section 1201(a) and Section 1201(b).  See 
Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(requiring that the plaintiff in a case alleging violation of Section 1201(a)(2), trafficking in 
technology used to obtain unauthorized access to a protected work, prove that use of the 
technology had some nexus to infringement of a copyright).   
Chamberlain Group implicitly relies on the work to soften the boundary between 
DMCA claims and the Copyright Act; MDY Industries implicitly relies on the work to 
harden that boundary.  In MDY Industries itself, the court of appeals found the defendant 
liable under Section 1201(a)(2) for trafficking in technology designed to facilitate 
circumventing access to a copyrighted work.  The court concluded that the relevant 
technology facilitated access to parts of the plaintiff’s online videogame that consisted of 
its “dynamic non-literal elements,” characterized by the lower court as the “real-time 
experience of traveling through different worlds, hearing their sounds, viewing their 
structures, encountering their inhabitants and monsters, and encountering other 
players.”  MDY Industries, 629 F.3d at 943.  The tension in that definition between the 
idea of the intangible work of authorship and the tangible form in which the work is 
embodied, even characterizing the latter as an “experience,” is palpable, and it evokes the 
same tension—call it a boundary—in the MassMoCA litigation.  See supra notes 73-77 
and accompanying text.  
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boundaries, therefore, between the unit and the whole and between the author 
and the audience.  Giving full rein to authorial interests in the work suggests that 
the author should have unlimited or nearly unlimited discretion over the 
characterization of his product, at almost any point in the life of the product, 
whether for marketing and commercialization purposes, for infringement 
purposes, damages purposes, or some combination of these.  When a creative 
product is released into the world, some number of copyright works are released 
with it, and as part of it.  The balance of that material is shared with the audience 
without copyright protection attached. 
 To illustrate, consider the copyright status of a multi-episode television 
series.   That series may be characterized as a single copyrighted work, because its 
plots, characters, settings, and themes carry over from episode to episode, and if 
so the work remains the same even if new episodes are produced.  Or that series 
may be characterized as a sequence of episodes, each of which constitutes a 
separate work.  A record album or compact disc (CD) is likewise both a single 
work and a compilation of underlying individual songs, each of which is a work.  
Parts of the boundary object are inhabited by commercial markets for the series 
and/or for each episode (and, correspondingly, for the full album or CD and/or 
for each individual song); other parts are inhabited by public access to and reuse 
of elements that do not comprise the series as a whole (if that is judged to be a 
work) or any particular episode (which might also or alternatively be considered a 
work).  Moreover, any creative thing not only might be combined with other 
creative things to form a single compilation or collective work, and might be de-
composed into subsidiary things that might themselves be treated as works, but 
those subsidiary things might themselves be de-composed into further works, or 
combined with other things to form other compilations or collections.  In each 
transition, the potential for dis-assembly and re-formation of the initial item 
creates an opportunity for the work as boundary object to mediate among 
controlled exploitation of the work in one or more markets and public or other 
use not governed by copyright limits. 
Courts have used the work as this sort of boundary object both in statutory 
damages calculations and in infringement settings.  The American copyright 
statute’s statutory damages provisions require that damages for infringement be 
computed according to the number of works infringed, rather than the number of 
infringements or the number of copies produced by the infringer. F99F  Cases having 
to do with works comprised of other works, that is, compilations or collective 
works, cause problems.  In Bryant v. Media Right Productions, Inc.,F100F the court 
computed statutory damages in a case involving infringement of a copyrighted 
record album by treating the entire album—a compilation—as a single work, 
                                                                                                                                     
99 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2012). 
100 603 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2010). 
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rather than as a collection of separate (and therefore compensable) works.  The 
statute itself says that a compilation work is to be treated as a single work for 
purposes of assessing statutory damages.F101F Should the album have been treated 
as a compilation work?  A significant factor in the court’s decision was the fact 
that the copyright owner had registered the album with the Copyright Office as a 
compilation, had sold the compilation as an album, and had registered copyrights 
in some but apparently not all of the individual songs. F102F  Because the owner had 
made that choice in the first place, the court in effect barred the owner from 
having a second bite at the characterization apple when infringement and 
damages, rather that registration and marketing, were at issue.   
Focusing on the album as such tends to reduce the amount of damages 
recoverable by a successful plaintiff.  In the current era, when recorded music is 
often sold on a song-by-song basis rather than on an album basis, focusing on the 
album may discount the actual economic injury caused by the infringement.  A 
record album that contains eight songs is a work in the same statutory sense as a 
record album that contains ten or twelve songs, even though the economic value 
of the two works might be different.  The plain reading of the statute in Bryant 
strikes some as indifferent to the logic of copyright markets and unfair to 
authors.F103F Other courts have looked to an “independent economic value” 
standard—a third-party or audience perspective—for determining whether 
something is a work.  In Columbia Pictures Television v. Krypton Broadcasting 
of Birmingham, Inc.,F104F the defendant had infringed several copyrighted episodes 
of a television series.  For statutory damages purposes, the court determined that 
each episode should be treated as a separate work, because each episode could be 
treated as an independent economic unit.105  But the episodes were generally 
packaged by the copyright owner as a series for purposes of broadcast television 
deals.  The plaintiff’s economic injury therefore corresponded more closely to 
treatment of the series as a single work.  The rule of Bryant runs the risk of 
under-compensating copyright owners.  The rule of Columbia Pictures Television 
runs the risk of over-compensating them.   
                                                                                                                                     
101 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2012). 
102 Bryant, 603 F.3d at 141.  The court assumed that copyrights in all of the songs 
had been properly registered.  See id. at 140 n.4. 
103 See Goldstein, supra note 10, at 1184–85 (discussing the disparate treatment 
given to compilations). 
104 106 F.3d 284 (9th Cir. 1997). 
105 See also Twin Peaks Productions, Inc. v. Publications Intern., Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366 
(2d Cir. 1993) (holding that infringement of eight episodes of a television series should be 
treated as infringement of eight independent works, or eight independent marketable 
things, when assessing statutory damages). 
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The rule that a “whole TV series is a single work,” rejected in the damages 
context by Columbia Pictures Television, was accepted in the infringement 
context in Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publishing Group, Inc. F106F  
Characterizing the Seinfeld television series in the context of infringement by 
substantial similarity, the court determined, with little discussion, that the entire 
series should be treated as a single work when compared with the defendant’s 
Seinfeld trivia book.F107F  That case is justly criticized for using an unduly elastic 
concept of the work in order to capture a work published by the defendant that 
many believe should have been characterized as noninfringing, either because of 
a lack of similarity in the first place, or because the defendant was engaged in fair 
use, or both.F108F  But the details of the critique miss the point that the context of 
the work as such defined the boundary between control of the creative content 
allocated to the copyright owner, on the one hand, and free re-use of that content 
allocated to the accused infringer.  The defendant’s trivia book appropriated 
specific bits from specific episodes of the Seinfeld  show:  identities of both major 
(recurring) and minor (non-recurring) characters, character traits, plot points, 
props, sets and settings, costumes, and so on.  Each bit was arguably an 
unprotectible fact about an episode or about the series as a whole, that is, not a 
work.  In the aggregate, however, the bits added up, in the court’s judgment, to a 
substantially similar copy – an aesthetically and commercially similar copy – of  
the series taken as a whole.  That is, the plaintiff’s work.   
To be sure, at least one recent, notable case has reached what might be 
considered different conclusion.  In Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc. v. RDR 
Books,109 the defendant stood accused of infringing copyrights in J.K. Rowling’s 
several Harry Potter novels by creating a print version of a “Lexicon,” or 
encyclopedia, that catalogued plot points, characters, beasts, settings, spells, and 
other attributes of the novels in excruciating detail.  The court treated the Harry 
Potter novels as a single source for purposes of the infringement analysis, 
although it repeatedly referred to the novels as distinct works, and it appeared to  
judge the Lexicon to be noninfringing under the fair use doctrine110 with respect 
to the novels themselves though infringing by virtue of its reproduction of an 
excessive amount of separate and specific Rowling companion works.111  The 
                                                                                                                                     
106 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998). 
107 Id. at 140 (distinguishing Twin Peaks Prod., Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 
1366 (2d Cir. 1993). 
108 See, e.g., Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms 
Free Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 Yale L.J. 535, 544–45 (2004) (arguing that 
the court undervalued the defendant’s transformative expression).  
109 575 F. Supp. 2d 513 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
110 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
111 See Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc., 575 F. Supp. 2d at 549-51. 
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court determined that the Lexicon was in effect a reference work, rather than an 
aesthetically or commercially similar version of the Harry Potter series.  Its 
opinion is ambiguous, perhaps deliberately so, on the question of the identity of 
the work that the Lexicon was alleged to have infringed.   Individual entries in the 
Lexicon matched individual items in the series.  But only in some instances 
involving more elaborate and detailed summaries of certain plot elements did 
those items rise to the level of copyrightable work, potentially infringed by the 
defendant.  In the sense of this chapter, that the idea of the work is a boundary 
object mediating the interests of different practices and their practitioners, the 
court’s judgment in total is itself suggestive evidence that the idea of the work is 
doing just that.  The copyright work created by J.K. Rowling and owned by 
Warner Bros. contains portions limited and controlled by them, and portions 
given, in effect, to those who would create encyclopedic companions.  The court 
in Warner Bros. suppressed making an explicit decision regarding the identity of 
the relevant plaintiff’s work.  In doing so, it expanded the ability of an accused 
infringer to practice creativity by producing a reference work. 
 
E.  Made, Not Found: Manufactured Works, Natural Ideas 
Works may be characterized in different ways at times and over time, but the 
idea of the work in any particular instance is also something that remains 
fundamentally the same.  This is true both in the general sense that the idea of 
the work is meant to be the same across artistic disciplines, media, and eras and 
in the specific sense that once a work has been created, it cannot change.  The 
work itself is static, even if the law permits authors, courts, and others to re-
characterize what it is.  But, of course, things change.  Art changes.  Do works 
change?   
Courts wrestle in this sense with the idea of the work as a boundary between 
static and stable works, on the one hand, and dynamic and changing works, on 
the other hand.  Let us call this a boundary between creative form and creative 
flow, sometimes expressed as a boundary between culture and nature and as 
copyright’s distinction between idea and expression.  For an illustration, consider 
a recent case involving gardens and landscapes. 
In Kelley v. Chicago Park District,F112F the plaintiff, without question an 
established and successful artist, designed an elaborate public flower garden with 
the permission and participation of relevant public authorities.  After a long 
period of maintenance of the garden and then disputes between the designer and 
the owner of the garden space, the owner, the Chicago Park District, made 
substantial modifications to the garden over the objection of the designer.  The 
designer, claiming that the landscape design was  an original work of authorship 
                                                                                                                                     
112 635 F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 2011). 
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protected in copyright, sued for violations of the right to integrity of the work 
under the Visual Artists Rights Act.  Among the questions faced by the court was 
whether the designed public garden was a “work of visual art,” or a work of any 
kind, covered by the statute.  The court of appeals, rejecting the plaintiff’s claim, 
concluded that it was not, although for reasons related to the manner in which 
the parties framed the issue, the case did not decide whether or not it was.  The 
court began by accepting (as the parties had) that the landscape design consisted 
of a painting or a sculpture, the categories of copyrightable expression that it 
most resembled,F113F      that is, a kind of artistic work,  and then considered whether 
that work met the requirements of the statute as to originality and fixation.   
The court concluded that it did not.  The court worried that copyright here 
was asked to recognize a work that was “infinitely malleable.”F114F The court 
concluded (in a questionable bit of reasoning) that the garden did not rise to the 
level of originality or stable fixation required by the law, because the living 
garden was subject to inevitable changes over time, and the changes were not the 
product of the plaintiff’s authorship. F115      So, while the court itself gave little weight 
to idea of the work itself aside from the statute’s other subject matter 
requirements, originality and fixation, there is a boundary principle in play that is 
based on the idea of the work but that is defined by subject matter tests, not by 
the idea of the work as an independent, autonomous thing. 
In dicta the court expressed skepticism that the plaintiff’s landscape design 
should be treated as a painting or a sculpture, that is, that the design should be 
treated as a work in the first place.  Were the opinion to be reconstructed along 
more sensible lines, one would argue that the landscape design was neither a 
painting nor a sculpture, nor “like” either of those things, and therefore failed to 
constitute a work in the first place.  Originality, expression, and fixation might be 
found wanting, and their absence given as reasons to support this hypothetical 
judgment, even though it should be noted that an author’s originality and 
expression might be present, and fixation might be found, yet a copyrightable 
work might still be absence.  To support the case for the defense, one could 
analogize the landscape design not to a painting or to a sculpture but instead to 
an elaborate meal prepared by a trained chef.  The chef, we know, is a kind of 
creator, working with natural and prepared ingredients, blending them in 
original and even expressive ways, anticipating their interaction with natural 
processes (such as heat and cold), and “fixing” the result in the form of the meal 
as presented at table.  Yet it is widely understood (though not without some 
                                                                                                                                     
113 Id. at 292. 
114 Id. at 301. 
115 Id. at 303–04. 
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controversy116) that neither the chef’s techniques, the chef’s recipes, nor the 
resulting meals are protected by copyright. 
My reconstruction of what the court might have been trying to do suggests 
that there is more to the boundary problem here than the record allowed the 
court to address.  The court wrote:  “The Park District suggests that Wildflower 
Works is an uncopyrightable ‘method’ or ‘system.’”F117F It continued: “Although 
Wildflower Works was designed to be largely self-sustaining (at least initially), 
it’s not really a ‘method’ or ‘system’ at all.  It’s a garden.”F118 
Unpacking that last statement (“It’s a garden”; therefore, by implication, it 
cannot be a work), here as in the cuisine example above the work operates as a 
boundary object that lies between yet connects static works and dynamic things, 
between static things and dynamic “processes” or “systems,” and between the 
static created work and the dynamic natural idea.  Traditional copyright law and 
its focus on the independent, intangible creative thing contrasts with deeper, 
organic processes that are revealed by nature, even while both perspectives on 
landscape design and gardens themselves are literally and physically present in 
one and the same place and space.   The court’s answer to the challenge of 
distinguishing these things —“[i]t’s a garden”—is clearly inadequate, because it 
simply re-states the issue.  Why is a garden not a work?  A work qua work is 
communicative and expressive, not simply functional. A work expresses the 
author’s creativity and the audience’s response; a work communicates the fact 
that humans produced it.F119F  Anything else—plants, flowers, animals, and 
prepared food—communicates (or may communicate) the fact that organic 
processes are primarily driving what we see and experience.F120F  Nature is given, 
both in the sense that it simply exists in a sort of pre-cultural state, and also in 
the spiritual or religious sense that nature is a gift from someone or something 
other than ourselves.  Earlier in this chapter I referred to works as boundary 
objects that may frame distinctions between material that circulates in market-
based economies and material that circulates in gift-based economies.  My 
                                                                                                                                     
116 See Christopher Buccafusco, On the Legal Consequences of Sauces: Should 
Thomas Keller's Recipes Be Per Se Copyrightable?, 24 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 1121 
(2007). 
117 Id. at 303. 
118 Id. 
119 See Abraham Drassinower, Copyright Infringement as Compelled Speech, in 
New Frontiers in the Philosophy of Intellectual Property (Annabelle Lever ed., 
forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1954858 (arguing that a work 
subject to copyright is a communicative act). 
120 This distinction evokes the principle of patent law that “laws of nature” may not 
be patented.   See Mayo Collaborative Svcs., 132 S. Ct. at 1293-94. 
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identification here of nature with the idea of gifts is meant to evoke that same 
distinction.  I believe that the court in Kelley was, inarticulately and ambiguously, 
using the idea of the work to divide the world before into precisely those two 
realms.    
Gardeners and chefs know, of course, that what appears to be “natural” often 
reflects deep and thoughtful engagement by humans.  The vocabulary of giving is 
far from univocal; we may say that we receive gifts (from God, from nature, from 
others), and that we have gifts (special skills) and that we share them.  Often, the 
conceptual linkages embedded in those phrases go unrecognized and unexplored, 
as do linkages between gifts and agency.   Characterizing nature as a gift and as a 
source of gifts does not necessarily exclude human agency.  To exclude gardening 
and cooking categorically from copyright amounts not only to excluding the effort 
and ingenuity of a particular author but also the practices, traditions, and 
expectations of an entire field.  That field may be human-directed and cultural; 
that field may be scientific and technological; that field may be spiritual and only 
partly known or knowable by humans.  The work in the case of natural things and 
processes is therefore the locus of a debate about what is in copyright and what is 
beyond it, or what is owned and marketable and what is given (recognizing  and 
shared.  The boundary established by the work and identified by Kelley in the 
court’s quick, dismissive statement is the contested boundary between the 
owned, controlled “creative,” or made, which is commodifiable and 
merchantable, and the unownable, evolving natural, which is a gift and a source 
of gifts. 
 
IV.  Conclusion 
The goal of this chapter has been primarily descriptive.  I have argued that 
the study of the copyright work is an example and illustration of the study of IP 
things in general, including not only works but also inventions, marks, secrets, 
designs, and so on.  I showed in earlier research that these things are not only 
legal constructs but legal constructs that emerge from patterns of social 
interaction and of legal and policy decisionmaking.  The purpose of this chapter 
has been to advance that research by putting those patterns in a broader 
framework grounded in the idea of boundaries.  The copyright work has been 
incompletely understood because courts, scholars, litigants, and others have 
spent too much time trying to define the outer boundaries of the work and not 
enough time trying to understand the work as boundary or, more precisely, as a 
boundary object.   
The concept of the boundary object is borrowed from research in 
information science.  Such an object is an incompletely specified thing whose 
very incompleteness allows that object to bridge practices and expectations 
across adjacent and overlapping but distinct communities of practice and 
expectation.  This chapter shows that in American copyright law, the copyright 
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work acts as a boundary object, crudely and sometimes incompletely 
distinguishing spheres of market-based social activity from other spheres.  
Sometimes those other spheres are other, related exchange-based markets; 
sometimes, those spheres are characterized by open, unregulated distribution or 
exchange or are governed by non-copyright institutions and norms.  Because 
works, as things, are conceived intuitively as integrated objects, those spheres 
must co-exist.  As a boundary object, the work allows them to do so in particular 
places and times.  Articulation and interpretation of a work that is produced by a 
particular author or authors, and accessed, read, and re-used by particular 
readers, listeners, critics, and consumers, simultaneously and effectively becomes 
a means of expressing the interests and histories of broader social groups and 
institutions. Some of those interests and histories find formal recognition and 
acceptance in acknowledged forms of copyright works; some do not.  Law, in this 
sense, both makes and interprets culture. 
What do I intend as the implications of  my argument?  The chapter does not 
make a case for law reform, or even necessarily for greater investment by courts 
and policymakers in the concept of the work.  My more modest aim has been to 
explore and to highlight the respective roles of things and of groups in a body of 
law that is often conventionally framed in terms of relationships alone, and 
specifically in terms of relationships between individual agents – an author or 
creator, on the one hand, and a reader, or consumer, or new author or creator, on 
the other.   
More broadly, the point of the chapter is that questions and solutions 
surrounding the notion of things in law, including IP things, are not limited to 
questions and solutions connected to property law and theory.  Things– 
copyright works, in the case at hand–are ways of organizing and interpreting 
social life.  If that perspective has been persuasive in the context of the copyright 
work, then the boundary object analysis may be applied to the patentable 
invention and to the mark or the sign in trademark law, to designs, secrets and 
know-how, personas, and beyond.  
Boundary object analysis itself is far more elaborate and nuanced than I 
allow for here.  Boundary objects have different types and forms; there are “good” 
or “successful” boundary objects and there are “bad” or “weak” boundary objects.  
Boundary objects are subject to power dynamics and to hierarchy and coercion.  
By introducing the idea of gift exchange in broad and crude juxtaposition with 
market-based exchange, for example, I do not mean to elide the possibility that 
gift economies may be fraught with problems, and the boundary objects may be 
mis-used or badly designed in ways that reinforce their problematic character.  
There is much work to be done in exploring the further implications of boundary 
object analysis in IP law.  I do not suggest that the concepts of the copyright work 
or of IP things generally are problem-free or that the concepts necessarily should 
be left as-is.  In fact, by critiquing IP things as both expressions of culture and 
shapers of culture, I hope to clarify the ways in which public policy goals and 
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questions of social welfare may be expressed through the ideas of IP things. 
Along the way, in this chapter I have critiqued indirectly the law’s shift from 
a more contextual approach to the copyright work as the creation of an author to 
a more abstract, universalized approach.  In order to make the copyright work 
more effective as an instrument of policy, that shift might be reversed somewhat, 
by working the law back toward context, either by recommending that courts 
interpret the idea of the work with greater sensitivity to the particulars of practice 
in a given community, tradition, or market.  To bring that general proposition 
into focus and potential application, further work in this area should pursue the 
meanings of boundaries themselves.  It would be a mistake to invest the idea of 
boundaries, even as I have referred to them above, with an over-arching sense of 
rigidity or solidity.  That is, what I see and foresee is the end of the work as an 
independent, autonomous, static thing and its renewal as a modestly fluid, 
dynamic thing embedded in multiple communities and practices.  Boundary 
object analysis may be applied likewise to other IP things and to legal objects 
generally, while recognizing that not every thing is a boundary object.  
Sometimes, an object is simply an object. 
Embedded within the several boundaries that I have identified in this 
chapter is a challenge to intellectual property’s fundamental interest in creativity, 
or creation of the new.  The statement in Kelley v. Chicago Park District that 
gardens cannot be copyrightedF121F fails to explore reasons why that might be so.  
Let us think of “gardens” and “gardening” as metaphors as well as literal things 
and practices.  Treat a creator as a gardener and a creation as a garden, or as 
something that has a dynamic existence for a time after its initial production, in 
the hands of the creator as well as in the hands of third-parties—readers, viewers, 
interpreters, and curators.  The contours of that follow-on life of the work, both 
static and dynamic in different parts, are of significant interest to the copyright 
system because of their critical roles in preserving knowledge and creativity for 
access and use by later generations.  I have referred to these processes in their 
collective sense as “curation.”F122F  A gardener, too, is a kind of curator.  In the 
contemporary sense and in the context of digital networks, copyright interests in 
curation are only likely to grow, because no knowledge or creativity curates itself, 
and digital forms of knowledge, particularly when they might be distributed 
across networks, require at least as much curation, and perhaps more, than forms 
that originated on more tangible, analog media, such as books.  IP law is properly 
concerned with the production and distribution of new things – new works, 
inventions, and so on – but the complete study of those things reminds us that IP 
                                                                                                                                     
121 Kelley v. Chicago Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 303–04 (7th Cir. 2011). 
122 See Michael J. Madison, Knowledge Curation, 86 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1957, 
1958 (2011) (calling the “problem of cultural heritage” the “challenge of knowledge 
curation”). 
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law is likewise concerned with the preservation and curation of existing things. 
The note is well-grounded in history.  The political movement of the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries that supported recognition of the independent author 
as a legal character and the intangible work as a legal thing were grounded in a 
specific conception of the work as an independent, autonomous, and natural 
product.F123F   
My tentative identification of the boundary between market exchange and 
gift exchange signifies that the large debates in copyright law are not merely over 
the scope of the author’s (or producer’s) right and the scope of the user’s or 
consumer’s or next author’s right, or the scope of the public interest in general.  
The large debates are about the shape and behavior of relevant institutions in 
each sphere:F124F   firms, collectives, and other formal institutions for producing 
and exchanging copyrighted works in the marketplace; norms, traditions, 
commons mechanisms, and other institutions (such as universities, museums, 
archives, and lending libraries) for sharing copyrighted works and for curating 
them, in the gift sphere.  That list of institutions is preliminary and illustrative 
only.  The challenge here is to flesh out the institutional sense of what exists on 
each side of the relevant boundary and to understand how social life is organized 
in those places, and how it should be organized, relative to those cultural 
resources.  Why, in other words, do we assign certain social practices to the 
market, and why do we assign certain social practices to other domains?  Debates 
and disputes among specific authors, publishers, intermediaries, and accused 
infringers are usually framed for doctrinal purposes in terms of specific agents 
and specific creations, but the real players in the theaters of copyright are 
organizational, institutional, and cultural.  The concept of the copyright work as 
boundary object helps us make explicit connections between the former 
(individual agents) and the latter (institutions and practices). 
Finally, what do we make of the changing roles of law and physics in all of 
this?  Neither the phenomena of the law (copyright works, as legal things) nor the 
phenomena of things themselves (works of art, as non-legal things) – are static.  
This point goes not only to questions about the work but also to things more 
broadly.  Legal things, in my telling, are related to but distinct from phenomenal 
things; legal things, I suggest, have a dynamic character.  Phenomenal things, in 
my telling, are largely given, and they are largely given in a centralized, 
                                                                                                                                     
123 See Mario Biagioli, Nature and the Commons: The Vegetable Roots of 
Intellectual Property, in Living Properties: Making Knowledge and Controlling 
Ownership in the History of Biology 241 (Max Planck Institute for the History of 
Science Preprint 382) (Jean-Paul Gaudillière, Daniel J. Kevles & Hans-Jörg Rheinberger 
eds. 2009) (drawing attention to the use of naturalizing metaphors in the writing of 
Edward Young). 
124 Julie E. Cohen, Copyright as Property in the Post-Industrial Economy: A 
Research Agenda, 2011 Wis. L. Rev. 141, 165. 
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hierarchical sense.  Conventionally, an author writes a book; a publisher 
publishes the book.  The law examines that book and identifies a “work.”  I claim 
that this work is then used by copyright law to define boundaries in social life.F125F   
I have not, however, acknowledged that both phenomenal things and the law 
itself have dynamic characters and are subject to processes of cultural 
construction and interpretation, yet both clearly are changeable and constructed 
– that is, built by culture as much as found in culture.  Digital network technology 
is rapidly making this explicit with respect to phenomenal things themselves.  We 
have already seen file-sharing technologies adopt complex things and de-
compose them.  Record albums become sharable files; Hollywood motion 
pictures and giant computer programs are broken down into shareable torrents.  
Distributed technologies of de-composition beget distributed technologies of re-
composition.  To wit:  The emerging science of 3D printing may soon offer 
individuals the power to create or replicate tangible things in the home, F126F just as 
the personal computer first offered individuals the power to create or replicate 
intangible things.  We have already seen processes of distributed production 
(what Benkler has called “commons-based peer production”F127F) create complex 
objects, such as open source computer software, and Wikipedia.   
I close with the following speculation, derived from the fact that my 
exploration of things and of groups is part of a broader interest in the sources and 
character of law itself.  This review of the copyright work has been a case study of 
how a particular legal thing is created and governed in law.  If these things are 
not what they seem, for the reasons suggested in the previous paragraph, then is 
law, too, not what it seems?  Is law, particularly to the extent that it relies on and 
establishes things and groups, losing its essentially centralized character?  Open 
source licenses and Creative Commons licenses and their emerging cousins are, 
in important ways, peer-produced forms of law and governance, enforceable via 
communal norms related to gift exchange models with respect to specified things 
at least as much as they may be enforceable by courts attuned to assumptions of 
market-based exchange, and perhaps more so.F128F  If things are boundary objects 
                                                                                                                                     
125 It should be obvious that this sequence has a recursive character, but the 
recursion is necessarily slow-moving. 
126 See The printed world, The Economist, Feb. 10, 2011, at 77. 
127 See Yochai Benkler, Coase's Penguin, or, Linux and the Nature of the Firm, 112 
Yale L.J. 369, 375-378 (2002). 
128 See Michael J. Madison, Brett M. Frischmann & Katherine J. Strandburg, 
Constructing Commons in the Cultural Environment, 95 Cornell L. Rev. 657, 661-62 
(2010).  For a different critique of centrally-produced law in an economy characterized by 
distributed production, see Gillian K. Hadfield, Legal Infrastructure and the New 
Economy, 8 I/S: J. L. & Pol'y for Info. Soc'y 1 (2012) (advocating production of law in 
private markets). 
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with respect to social practices, and the (legal) power to make things represents 
the (legal) power to make the boundaries represented in those objects, then 
distributed thing-making technologies and distributed law-making practices 
threaten to de-center law as a central source of authority over the shape of those 
practices.  If I, with or without some relevant group, can make my own “thing,” I 
can, in a sense, make my own law and my own social world.  Limits on thing-
making and law-making stem, if they arise at all, not from the relationship of 
things to property law (thus confirming my initial reluctance to frame this project 
in terms of property law) but from the normative shape of society as a whole.   
 
 
